



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON PURPOSE 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE JUDGMENT 
INS v SAFATSA 1988 1 SA 868 {A> 
(WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO 




Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfillment of part of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Laws in approved courses and a minor dissertation. The other part of the 
requirement for this degree W@S the completion cf a programme of courses. 
SEPTEMBER 1993 










The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 













TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
SECTION II: THE ELEMENT OF CAUSATION 
1. Introduction 
2. General approach to causation 
2.1 SY Safatsa 1988 1 SA 868 (A) 
2.2 Subsequent decisions 
3. Possible reasons for this approach 
3.1 SY Safatsa 1988 1 SA 868 (A) 
3.2 Subsequent decisions 
3.3 Opinions of writers 
4. Conclusion 
SECTION III: THE BASIS OF COMMON PURPOSE LIABILITY 
1. Introducti9n 
2. Sy SafatSa 1988 1 SA 868 (A) 
3. Sy Mgedezi 1989 1 SA 687 (A) 
4. The development in subsequent decisions 
5 . Cone lus ion 
SECTION IV: COMMON PURPOSE AND MENS REA 
1. Introduction 
2. General aspects 
3. When must mens rea be assessed? 
4. Foreseeability of manner in which result ensues 
























SECTION V: COMMON PURPOSE AND CULPA 41 
1. Introduction 41 
2. s v Safatsa 1988 1 SA 868 (A) 41 
3. Development in subsequent decisions 42 
4. Opinions of writers 47 
5. Conclusion 49 
SECTION VI: DISSOCIATION FROM COMMON PURPOSE 50 
1. Introduction 50 
2. Development through the cases 51 
2.1 Sy Ndebu 1986 2 SA 113 (ZSC) 51 
2.2 S v Nomakhlala 1989 1 SACR 300 (A) 52 
2.3 Sy N\zo 1990 3 SA 1 (A) 53 
2.4 Sy Beahan 1992 1 SACR 307 (ZS) 53 
2.5 Sy Singo 1993 1 SACR 226 (A) 55 
3. Conclusion 57 










SECTION I: INTRODUCTION 
Si in rixa percu~us homo perierit, ictus unius 
cuiusque in hoc collectorum contemplari oportet.1 
The doctrine of common purpose, which hails from English 
law, was introduced into South African law via the Native 
Territories Penal Code. 2 The first South African criminal 
case 3 in which this doctrine was applied outside the field 
of application of the abovementioned act, was R.._y_ 
Garnsworthv 4 , where it was formulated as follows: 
Where two~or more persons combine in an 
undertaking for an illegal purpose, each one of 
them is liable for anything done by the other of ov 
others of the combination, in the furtherance 'of 
their object, if what was done was what they knew 
or ought to have known, would be a probable result 
of their endeavouring to achieve their object.5 
According to Visser and Vorster,6 this doctrine was probably 
imported into our law due to difficulties experienced in 
1 D XLVIII.8.17: 'If a man dies after having been 
struck in the course of a quarrel, the blows of every one 
who took part in this should be investigated' - own 
translation. 
2. Section 78 of the Native Territories Penal Code Act 
24 of 1886 (C) provided: 'If several persons form a common 
intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and to assist 
each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence 
committed by any one of them in the prosecution of such 
common purpose, the commission of which offence was, or 
ought to have been, known to be a probable consequence of 
the prosecution of such common purpose.' (Quoted in Rabie 
"The doctrine of common purpose" (1971) SALJ 229.) See also 
R v Taylor 1920 EDL 318 323. 
3 It was also applied in the earlier civil case of 
McKenzie v Yan der Merwe 1917 AD 41. 
4 1923 WLD 17. 
5 19. 






proving which individual out of more than one possible 
participant actually caused the death of a deceased.7 
[;Since this early application, the doctrine of common purpose 
ll~as been relied on extensively by the courts.a Although the 
I' octr ine has largely fQund application in cases . of murder, , 1it has also been applied in cases of treason 9 public wiolence,10 assault,11 rape12i housebreakingi3 robbery14 
theft15, arson,16 incitement, 7 conspiracyl8 and culpable 
homicide.19 In this dissertation the emphasis will be on the 
relation between the doctrine of common purpose and the 
' crime of murder as a materially defined crime - a 
, so-called "consequence crime". <Due to the close relation i, between murder and culpable homicide, certain aspects. of the 
• \ latter offence will also be examined.) The statements made 
1 ;I regarding the crime of murder could of course mutatis : \J mutandis be applied to other common law and statutory crimes 
;: l11j as well. · .., , ~,; l ' 
,, ~,'. :: . 
:Ji
1
Visser and Vorster explain that the doctrine of common 
\ i \ purpose has been adapted in order to bring it into line with 
~lthe present-day subjective approach in determining 
1• 
7. See also Duba "What was wrong with the Sharpeville 
Six decision?" (1990) SACJ 185. 
8 See eg Rabie op cit 230. 
9 S v Banda 1990 3 SA 466 (BGD). 
10. s v Mashotonga 1962 2 SA 321 <SR) - in fact. 
common purpose is one of the elements of the crime of public 
violence. 
545 
11 B v Bava:t 1947 4 SA 128 (N) i s y 
(0). 
\ 
12 Thebe y s 1961 2 PH H247 (A) . 
13 B y G:coble:r:: 1918 EDL 124. 
14 s y Nkombani 1963 4 SA 877 (A). 
15 s y Mongalo 1978 1 SA 414 (0). 
16 E v Ma:go lisa 1965 3 SA 578 (PC). 
· 17: B v Begale--1960 -1--Sk 121--<A)-:-
18 B v Njenje 1966 1 SA 369 (SRA). 
19 See Section V infra. 








intention.20 In terms of the more recent application of 
"common purpose" it can be formulated as follows: 
Where two or more people agree to commit a crime 
or actively associate in a joint unlawful 
enterprise, each.will be responsible for specific 
criminal conduct bommitted by one of their number 
which falls within their common design.21 
According to Rabie, the practical effect of this would be 
the following in the case of murder: where a number of 
persons have a common purpose to commit a crime and they 
assist one anothe~ in the commission of that crime, all are 
guilty of murder _of~someone is killed in the process and if 
all had intent, usually in the from of dolus eventualis, in 
regard to the victim's death, without the question being 
posed whether the conduct of each is causally connected with 
the victim's-death.22 , .. 
3 
The question of a causal relationship (as far as the so-
called materially defined crimes are concerned) had long 
been a vexed issue, and pr~o·r-to~C?_ distinct views 
could be distinguished. On 't-he--0.r,i-e-har(d tliere were case§ in ~ 
which .the courts emphasized that the doctrine of common 
purpose could not be used to render an accused who did not 
causally contribute to the death of the deceased, liable for 
murder.23 In other cases the courts indicated (albeit by "'!¼---
implication) that a causal nexus was not required where the 
doctrine of common purpose was relied upon.24 
20 Visser and Vorster loc cit; Rabie Deelnemingsleer 
in die Strafreg 243-244. 
21. Burchell and Milton Principles of Criminal Law 
334-335. See also Burchell and Hunt Criminal Law 430; De Wet 
and Swanepoel Strafreg 192; Joubert Ced) LAWSA 113 par 117; 
Visser and Vorster loc cit; Snyman Strafreg 281; Whiting 
"Joining in" (1986) SALJ 38. · 
22 Rabie loc cit. 
23 s v Thomo 1969 1 SA 385 CA) 399-400H; s Y Williams 
1980 1 SA 60 (A); Sy Maxaba 1981 1 SA 1148 (A) 1155. 
- - ·- --·· -·-··-··-·-.. ·-··----- ·------------- - -- . - - --- -· ·- - ··•---·-. - -· - ........ - ·-· ·····-- -
24. See eg R v Mgxwiti 1954 1 SA 370 (A); R v Dladla 
1962 1 SA 307 (A); s v Malinga 1963 1 SA 692 (A); S v 
Madlala 1969 2 SA 637 CA); Sy Khoza 1982 3 SA 1019 (A); s___y 








,~his unce~tainty was finally settled by the Appellate 
4 
J
pudgment in S v Safatsa and Others25, where it was expressly 
lheld (per Botha JA) that a causal connection between the 
acts of each partner to the common purpose and the death of 
the deceased is not required. Although this decision largely 
,'. ended the debate surrounding the issue of causation it left 
I, I 
_ dissertation is to examine certain aspects of the 
ij
' a lot of questions una~swered. The purpose of this 
1 development of the doctrine of common purpose as set out in 
Safatsa and subsequent decisions,26 in order to ascertain to 
what extent these questions have beeri answered (if at all). 
f 
The specific.issues that will be addressed are the 
following: common purpose and the element of causation, the 
basis of common purpose liability, the relation between 
common purpose and mens rea, the applicability of common 
f purpose in negligence crimes (with specific reference to 
1 culpable homicide) and the question of dissociation from 
~
I common purpose,- It will also be necessary to examine the way 
in which evidence has been evaluated as a subsidiary issue 
in order to ascertain whether-any changes have taken place 
in this sphere. In order to place certain developments in 
the correct context, it will on occasion be necessary to 
, refer to decisions preceding Safatsa as well. 
~ It can safely be said that the Safatsa decision was not I' equally well received in all quarters. 27 Due to the effect 
\'.\inter alia of the mandatory death penalty,28 a lot of what 
i
: appeared to be politically motivated criticism was levelled 
at the decision. It is not the purpose of this dissertatbn 
j to explore this: . 
\ . 
25 1988 1 SA 868 (A). Incorrectly quoted in the 
African Law Reports, it should read Sefatsa - see Diar 
Sharpeville Six 5; Cameron "Inferential reasoning and 





26 Please see Annexure A for the dates of judgments 
in Safatsa and subsequent decisions. This is included to 
facilitate reference. 
27. See eg Burchell and Milton op cit 337; Davis 
"Capital punishment and the politics of the doctrine of 
common purpose" in Hansson & Van Zyl Smit (eds) Towards 
Justice? 143-145; Duba op cit 180; Cameron op cit 243-260; 
Lund "Extenuating circumstances, mob violence and common 
purpose" 1988 SACJ 260-268. 
28_ The position regarding the mandatory death penalty 
has subsequently been amended by the Criminal 




I ignore the misguided comments of hysterical 
politicians masquerading as lawyers, following 
upon the judgment delivered in the case reported 
as S v Safatsa and Others 1988 1 868 (A). 
Although this dictum~ Botha JA in the subsequent case of 
SY Mgedezi 29 is worded rather strongly, it is important to 
stress at the outset that this dissertation will deal with 
the implications of Safatsa for the purposes of the general 
principles of criminal liability only.30 
It has of course long been a subject of spirited academic 
debate whether the doctrine of common purpose should form 
part of South African criminal law at all. On the one hand 
there is a group which advocates the retention of this 
doctrine;31 on the other there is the school of thought 
which maintains that this doctrine has no right of 
existence, because of its disregard of the general 
principles of l!iability (specifically the element of 
causation), and that it could with equal success be replaced 
by "accomplice liability". 32 This of course also involves 
the well-known debate whether it is legally possible to be 
an accomplice to murder.33 (It is quite interesting to note 
that common purpose liability has been regarded throughout 
29 S v Mgedezi 1989 1 SA 687 (A) 7021. 
30 Inasmuch Section II contains certain references to 
"policy considerations", this must be seen within the narrc,w 
confines of the issues under discussion in this specific 
section. 
31 See Duba op cit 185; De Jager "Opset by 
groepsgewe ld" (1992) TSAR 315; Matzukis "The nature and 
scope of common purpose" (1988) SACJ 233. The arguments in 
favour of the doctrine will be referred to in greater detail 
in Section II infra. 
32. See Rabie op cit 236-237; Rabie "Kousali tei t en 
common purpose by moord" (1988) SACJ 242; Burchell and 
Milton op cit 348; Van Oosten "Deelneming aan 
gevolgsmisdade" (1979) De Jure 55-57; Ellis "Kante van die 
medepligtigheidsmisdaad" (1983) De Jure 356-372; Oosthuizen 
"Kousaliteit en common purpose in die strafreg" (1985) TSAR 
105; Strauss "Oorsaaklikheidsverband en daderskap" ( 1960) 
THRHR 108. I consider this view to be preferable. 
33. See eg Whiting op cit 54; Rabie "Medepligtigheid 
en ontbrekende kousaliteit by moord" (1988) SACJ 35-51; Mar8 
"The liability of the joiner-in for murder" (1990) SACJ 26-
34; Snyman op cit 291-293. 
5 





to found perpetrator liability.)34 Unfortunately, the scope 
of this dissertation does not allow a discussion of this 
aspect; for present purposes, it will be accepted that the 
doctrine of common purpose - whether wisely or not - is 
still to be regarded as an integral part of South African 
criminal law. 
·, 
There are some other interesting aspects of common purpose 
liability which unfortunately could not be addressed here 
either: the position of the so-called "joiner-in"35 (i.e. 
where participation in a common purpose to kill commences 
after the deceased has·been fatally wounded but while he ia 
still alive)36; the applicability of the doctrine of common 
purpose in cases of "strict liability"; 37 the role of 
"deindividuation" in common purpose cases and the 
possibility that deindividuation might serve to eliminate 
imputability (and thus criminal liability) instead of just 
serving as mitigation - the way in which it has featured up 
to now. 38 · .. 
I 
On a technical level it might be mentioned that the term 
"common purpose"39 will be preferred throughout. Although 
different terms, eg "common intent" 40, "gemeenskaplike 
34. Whiting loc cit; Rabie "Kousaliteit en common 
purpose" (1988) SACJ 239; Burchell and Milton op cit 347. 
35. See on this subject: Whiting op cit 38-54; Mare op 
cit 24-38; Snyman op cit 285-287; S v Motaung 1990 4 SA 485 
(A); S v Dladla 1991 1 SASV 465 (A). 
36. The situation that has been dealt with throughout 
here is one where participation in the common purpose 
commences before the deceased has received the fatal wound. 
-See also in this regard Sy Motaung 1990 4 SA 485 (A) 509B-
D; Burchell and Milton op cit 340. 
37. This aspect has ~eceived no attention in the 
literature or case law yet. 
38. See Davis op cit 146-148; Foster "Expert testimony 
on collective violence" in Hansson and Van Zyl Smit (eds) op 
cit 154-172; Sy Thabetha 1988 4 SA 272 (T) 280D-281F; 5-Y 
Motaung 1990 4 SA 485 (A) 526I; S v Matshili 1991 3 SA 264 
(A) 270J-274A; S v Khumalo 1991 4 SA 310 (A) 360I-362B. 
39 The Afrikaans equivalent being "gemeenskaplike 
oogmerk". 
40. See Rabie "The doctrine of common purpose" (1971) 
SALJ; he suggests that under certain 







opset" 41 or "gemeenskaplike doel" 42 have been used in 
literature and certain judgments, it is felt that "common 
purpose" denotes the implications of the doctrine with the 
most precision, and that it also serves to distinguish 
between "purpose" and "intent" (in the sense of dolus) as 
one of the elements of criminal liability. 
. ~ 
It is perhaps a little optimistic to presume that this 
enquiry will contribute towards "curing a position in our 
criminal law which has for many years suffered fr6m an 
overdose of sophistic reasoning and severely twisted 
principles". 43 An attempt will however be made to indicate 
that although the doctrine of common purpose has been 
subject to some degree of development since Safatsa, it is 
still a minefield of vagueness and uncertainty. 
41_ Sy Van der Merwe 1991 SACR 150 (T) 1551; De Beer 
"Strafbare mans lag" ( 1988) Die Landdros 76. 
42 Sy Nzo 1990 3 SA 1 (A) 12D. 











i .... · 
SECTION II: THE ELEMENT OF CAUSATION 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
Moord is die wederregtelike en opsetlike 
veroorsaking van.~die dood van ·n ander mens.44 
Ih this section the approach to the element of causation as 
it appears from the judgment in Sy Safatsa45 and subsequent 
decisions will first be examined. In the second place, 
possible reasons for this approach will be evaluated with 
reference to Safatsa and later judgments, as well as the 
opinions of certain writers. 
2. GENERAL APPROACH TO CAUSATION: 
2.1 S v SAFATSA 1988 1 868 <A>: 
In this case ~e Appellate Division was called on to decide 
"once and for all" on the question of causation in cases 
where a common purpose was alleged.46 Botha JA phrased the 
question in the following terms: 
Thus the question that must be faced squarely is 
this: in cases of the kind commonly referred to in 
our practice as cases of "common purpose", in 
relation to murder, is it competent for a 
i participant in the common purpose to be found guilty of murder in the absence of proof that his conduct individually caused or contributed _ causally to the death of the deceased?47 
After a close scrutiny of the relevant decisions, Botha JA 
comes to the conclusion that, in spite of the uncertainty 
created by a number of cases,48 the correct legal position 
- although never stated unequivocally - is that in cases of 
~ 
common purpose, the act of one participant in causing the 
death of the deceased, is imputed as a matter of law, to the 
other participants, provided that the necessary mens rea is 
present.49 , 
44 Snyman op cit 435. Emphasis supplied. 




48 _Eg_S y 
1 SA 60 (A) ; S y 
I supra. 
Thome 1-969 l SA---385--CA) i- S Y- Williams 1980----- -
Maxaba 1981 1 SA 1148 (A). See also Section 
49 See 896D-E and 898A. 
r 
i 
That being the existing state of the law relating 
to common purpose, it would constitute a drastic 
\ 
departure from a firmly established practice to 
hold now that a party to a common purpose cannot 
be convicted of murder unless a causal connection 
is proved between his conduct and the death of the 
7 deceased . 50 " 
Botha JA does address the argument that causation is a· 
fundamental element in the definition of the crime of murder 
which cannot be ignored, (and that the concept of active 
association with the act of killing by another is too vague 
to serve as a touchstone for liability): he states that in 
many cases where acceptable - and required - results are 
achieved by means of imputing the act of killing by one 
person to another by virtue of a common purpose, the 
adherence to the requirement of a causal connection between 
the conduct of the latter person and the death of the 
deceased would/"necess i tate stretching the concept of 
causation, inter alia by resorting to the device of 
"psychological causation", to such limits as to border on 
absurdity.51 In the process there would be a greater measure 
of vagueness and uncertainty than in regard to the 
application of the test of active association with the 
common purpose. The latter test simply involves an 
assessment of the facts of the particular case, and the 
factual issues to be resolved should not prove to be more 
difficult to resolve than many other issues encountered in 
any criminal case.52 
iHe explains that in cases of common purpose the act of one participant in causing the death of the deceased is imputed, as a matter of law, to the other participants.53 
9 
The principle of imputation, which according to Rabie 54 an.di 
Burchell,5b lies at the heart of common purpose liability, 
can be explained as follows: 
50 900H. Emphasis supplied. 
51 901B-D. 
52 90 lD-E. 
53 898A-B. 
-•- - ----- ·-·····-· 54--·-·····--------·-- - - - . --- - ·- .. ·------ -·----- ··-··--· ·---· --- --
. Rabie op cit 235. 
-- - -- ---- --- ----- -----· ------------·--------




Die handeling van die een of meer wat inderdaad 
die dood veroorsaak het, word beskou as die 
handeling van al die deelgenote. Dit is gevolglik 
nie belangrik om uit te maak of daar tussen elke 
beskuldigde en die slagoffer se dood 'n kousale 
verband bestaan nie.56 ... 
In spite of any criticism which might previously have been 
levelled against the principle of imputation, 57 _the judgment 
in Safatsa is quite unequivocal. The doctrine of .common 
purpose (and along with it, the principle of imputation) has 
now been granted express approval, in spite of the fact that 
it presents a significant departure from the general 
principles of criminal liability. (It is however important 
to point out that Safatsa did not herald any new 
developments in the law relating to common purpose; it 
merely served to clarify the state of the law as it had 
existed previously and to end any uncertainty which had 
prevailed up t6 this point.58) 
2.2 SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS: 
In Sy Mgedezi59, one of the most important features of the 
State case was that no state witness saw any of the accused 
actually inflicting any injury upon any of the four deceased 
which caused or contributed caus.ally to the death of any of 
the deceased, nor was any of the accused seen physically tc, 
assault the person referred to in Count 5 (attempted 
murder).60 Botha JA comments as follows: . 
The absence of evidence that any of the accused 
committed any act which was directly and 
1 physically linked to the causing of the death of 
any of the deceased or to the assault upon None 
means that liability for the deaths or the assault 
can attach to the accused only if the State proved 
that the accused acted in common purpose with 
those whose acts caused the deaths of the deceased 
or who took part in the assault upon None.6 1 
56 Rabie "Kousaliteit en common purpose by moord" 
(1988) SACJ 237. See also Rabie "The doctrine of common 
purpose" (1971) SALJ 235. 
57_ See eg Rabie op cit 236-237. 
58_ Matzukis op cit 227; Rabie "Kousaliteit en common 
purpose" ( 1988) SACJ 237-238. 










-·--------·---.---·---- - ~----- -
iJ ', 
The Court then proceeds to set out the five requirements 
which have to be met in order to come to the conclusion that 
the accused did in fact act in common purpose with those 
whose acts caused the deaths of the deceased.62 In 
principle, the same approach regarding causation is followed 
~sin Safatsa. ~ 
In Sy Memani63, Goldin JA agrees with the conclusion 
reached in Safatsa that under our common law it is not 
required to establish causation as a 'fundamental element in 
the definition. of the crime of murder· _64 
The same· approval is found in Sy Motaung65, where it is 
stated expressly that any uncertainty in regard to the issue 
of causation has been dispelled by Safatsa;66 in 5-Y. 
Khumalo 67 it is said that in cases of "gesamentlike optrede" 
the requirement. that the accused must have committed the 
fatal actus re~s is not always adhered to.68 Another 
decision where1 Safat~~ is referred to with obvious approval 
is Sy Yan der Merwe . 
Friedman J makes the following statement in Sy Banda70: 
Safatsa·s case unfortunately may have conveyed the 
impression on a mere cursory reading that in cases 
of murder, a causal connection between the acts of 
each participant in causing the death of the 
deceased need not be proved.71 
This statement is somewhat strange, especially in the light 
of the fact that Friedman J does align himself with the 
"amplification of the law re la ting to common purpose", as 
62 705I-706B. See also Section III infra. 
63 1990 2 SACR 4 (TkA) . 
\ 
64 7B-C. 
65 1990 4 SA 486 (A). 
66 509D. 
67 1991 4 SA 310 CA) . 
68 341G. 
199-1 SACR--150- (T)---156C-.----- - - -







set out in Safatsa and Mgedezi.72 (He also states that he 
need not for the purpose of this case concern himself with 
the controversy surrounding the issue of causation.)73 
3. POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS FOR THIS APPROACH: 
3 -1 S v SAFATSA 1988 "1 SA 868 CA>: 
The trial court in Safatsa dealt with the liability of the 
six accused by way of reference to "mededaders" and 
"medepligtiges", i.e. so-called "accomplice liability". 74 
Botha JA however, prefers to make use of the doctrine of 
common purpose: 
It is more usual, and in my view, with respect, 
more appropriate to deal with the liability of 
these accused for murder on the basis of what is 
called in our practice ·common purpose·, and it is 
on that basis that I proceed to discuss the 
matter.75 
He does not advance specific reasons for this point of view, 
but it is once again reiterated in his discussion of 
Burchell and Hunt's statement that "there is no magic about 
the doctrine of common purpose"76: 
I should add that I myself see no magic in the 
practice of the Courts - but I do see a lot of 
12 
common sense and expedience in it.77 - c~~ 
- ~ 0 1..,,,--. ~ ~ OPI"'· ~-1,.q 
It should already at this stage of the enquiry be quite -~ 
clear that Botha JA is of the opinion that the application 
of this doctrine (to be preferred to "accomplice liability") 
goes some way towards serving certain practical demands. 
This is confirmed by his remark that the English origin of 
the doctrine of common purpose is no reason for rejecting 
it, "if it satisfies the exigencies of the administration of 
our own criminal law"78_ 
72 500D. 
73 501C-D. 
74 See Safatsa 1988 1 SA 868 (A) 893I-J. 









3.2 SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS: 
In the judgment in Petersen's case, Botha JA once again made 
it quite clear that he considered accomplice liability and 
common purpose liability to be equally acceptable, with the 
latter being more practicable: 
Of ·n mens nou die saak benader uit die oogpunt 
van medepligtigheid, of socs in die praktyk 
gebruiklik is, uit die oogpunt van gesamentlike 
optrede met 'n gesamentlike oogmerk wat meebring 
dat die dader se handeling aan die appellant 
toegereken meet word .. _79 
In Banda, Friedman J refers to the Safatsa case with 
apparent approval: 
This sett;pg out of the legal P~¥?n is ~at only 
correct in principle, but is pr~ .. _au 
He is also in favour of the doctrine per se: 
Although this doctrine has been criticised ... I 
nevertheless believythaL:::;t,he doctrine of common 
purpose is a usef.U-1 and.--practica·I method of 
determining liabh~eyor innocence where more than 
one person is involved in a joint unlawful 
activity pursuant to their common design and 
objective ... 81 
3.3 OPINIONS OF WRITERS: 
The question of course arises what these "exigencies of the 
administration of our criminal law", referred to by Botha 
JA, would be. Snyroan provides at least a partial answer: 
Indien 'n mens derhalwe die aanspreeklikheid van 
'n individuele lid van die groep bepaal aan die 
hand van die gewone beginsels van oorsaaklikheid, 
is daar 'n wesenlike gevaar dat al twintig lede 
van die groep aanspreeklikheid vir moord mag 
vryspring weens die afwesigheid van bewys van 'n 
oorsaaklike verband tussen elke lid se handeling 
eri. Y se dood.82 
Duba advances the following explanation: 
79 423H- I. 
. - ___ 80.,. 499J. -Emphasis- suppHed ..... -- - -------.. -
81 50 lD-E. 





Common purpose liability was devised by the courts 
to deal with situations which made it difficult 
for the court to convict on the ordinary 
essentials of criminal liability due to the lack 
of one or more elements.83 · 
-~-
(He is however in favour of retaining the principle of 
common purpose, because of the difficulty of dealing with 
situations where a group of persons expressly agree to rob 
and kill and part of the group executes the agreement while 
part of the group provides the means of execution.84) 
The practical demands of the situation were described 
succinctly in Khumalo: 
Dit was, kortom, die optrede van barbare. 
Weersinwekkend. Geen beskaafde, geordende 
gemeenska:i;.kan soiets gedoog nie. Dit is optrede 
wat volstrek gestraf en swaar gestraf moet word.85 
It is quite interesting to note the description of the 
background to the Khumalo case as set out by De Jager86 (it 
is clear from his article that De Jager approves of the way 
in which these demands were addressed)87: 
L. 
Vir 'n geruime tyd al word die Suid-Afrikaanse 
gemeenskap deur groepsgeweld geteister. Ook die 
onderhawige feitestel bied ·n sprekende voorbeeld 
van sinnelose wraakgeweld. Smeulende ontevreden-
heid het op die weersinwekkendste, lafhartigste en 
mees primitiewe wyse tot uitbarsting gekom. 'n 
Enkele weerlose simbool van staatsgesag is agter-
volg, met klippe bestook, gesteek en uiteindelik 





83 Duba op cit 185. 
84 Ibid. This is, with respect, a classic example of 
accomplice liability! 
85 360F-G. 
86 See Hansson and Fine "Expert testimony on 
community attitudes to sentencing: the case of the Upington 
26" in Hansson and Van Zyl Smit op cit 175-176 for another 
--------- - - - ---- view . --- ·· 
87 See De Jager op cit 313-314. 




For Burchell and Milton, there is a very direct answer t,:J 
~he quest~on of why the general principles of liability must 
make way for common purpose liability: 
The reason for the common-purpose rule (which 
involves a departpre from the general principle 
that, in consequence crimes, the prosecution must 
establish a causal link between the conduct of the 
accused and the unlawful consequence) is clearly 
one of crime control.89 
According to the learned writers, the practical difficulty 
of proof confronting the prosecution in establishing a 
specific causal link between the conduct of each participant 
in a common purpose and the ultimate unlawful consequence 
caused by another participant in the same common purpose has 
played a prominent part in entrenching the principle of 
imputation. The existence of (mandatory) capital punishment 
for certain offences has also had an overall detrimental 
effect on the uniform application of general principles of 
liability. On the one hand, the manipulation of general 
principles has been directed at protecting an accused from 
the exposure to the death penalty (for instance the "partial 
excuse" rule in cases of provocation) . On the other hand, 
the common purpose principle, which permits a court to 
regard participants in a common purpose as co-perpetrators 
even though they do not satisfy the definitional element-a c,£ 
the crime, has increased the possibility of capital 
punishment being imposed ·on a wider range of persons despite 
the fact that their participation in the execution of the 
crime may be relatively small.90 
They argue (correctly, it is submitted) that the accused in 
Safatsa would have been liable to conviction for conspiracy, 
incitement or public violence, and that the punishment for 
these offences could well be severe enough to have both the 
desired deterrent effect and give vent to society's feeling 
that such conduct should be condemned. 91 (This is apart from 
the fact that they are of the opinion that accomplice 
liability would provide a ~ar more attractive alternative.) 
4. CONCLUSION: 
In conclusion, it can be said that the view expressed in 
Safatsa concerning the element of causation has now become 
firmly entrenched, as illustrated by subsequent decisions. 
As Du Plessis remarks (in connection with the extention of 
89 
15 
.--Bure he 11.-and._Milton _ op .. cit .338'.'."'..339-.. . ... ~--· -----•--·-···-----·------·- -·-- -·-
90 Burchell and Milton op cit 347. 









the doctrine of common purpose to culpable homicide in S v 
Kwad i 92 ): 
Dit sal nie help om die beswaar te opper dat die 
kousaliteitsvereiste daardeur negeer word nie, 
aangesien Safatsa (19881 SA 86 (A) en sien ook 
Mgedezi 1989 1 SA" 687 (A)) alle debatvoering ten 
opsigte van die uitskakeling van die 
kousaliteitsvereiste akademies gemaak het. 93 
(It is perhaps important to note that the element of 
causation is not be necessarily absent in all cases of 
common purpose: Rabie points out that where the common 
purpose arose from a prior agreement, a causal relationship 
may be seen because of the agreement which led to the 
victim's death.94) 
It appears from the cases cited that the disregard of 
general principles of criminal liability (more specifically 
the element of causation) brought about by the application 
of the doctrine of common purpose is based on the fact that 
this doctrine is more pragmatic and simply more "user 
friendly" (for the prosecution, that is) in situations where 
it might be awkward to prove a causal connection betwei% the 
conduct of a certain participant and the fatal result. 
The application of this doctrine for these purposes has 
understandably made for some extremely unpopular 
judgments. 96 
When looking for instance at the case of Sy Nzo97 against 
the.socio-political background prevailing at the time (more 
specifically the position of the ANC), one cannot help but 
wonder· to what extent "the exigencies of criminal law" 
played a role in the eventual findings of the majority,98 
92 1989 3 SA 524 (NC). See also Section V infra. 
93 Du Plessis "Gemeenskaplike oogmerk by strafbare 
mans lag?" (1990) TSAR 147.' 
94 Rabie "The doctrine of common purpose" (1971) SALJ 
238; also Mare "Gemeenskaplike oogmerk by strafbare mans lag" 
(1986) SACC 64. 
95. See also Rabie "Kousaliteit en common purpose" 
(1988) SACJ 238; Oosthuizen "Kousaliteit en common purpose 
in die strafreg_" (1985) TSAR 103-104. 
96_ See eg Burchell "S"'"__._y_..,_N""'zo.._ 1990 3 SA 1 (A)" (1990) 
------ ·-·------------------SACJ ... 3.45 ... -- ·--· -
97 1990 3 SA 1 (A). 




(especially in the light of the remark by Steyn JA, who 
delivered the minority judgment in liz..Q., that the majority 
judgment constituted an attempt to apply this doctrine to a 
factual situation "waarop dit nie toepasbaar is nie en 
waarvoor dit nie bedoel is nie"99) . 
.... 
In the final analysis, the use of the doctrine of common 
purpose (with the concomitant disregard of the requirement 
of causation) cannot be justified.100 It seems to be common 
cause that the State is often confronted in practice with 
great difficulties in trying to prove a causal nexus between 
the individual actions of a participant and the eventual 
result.101 A difficulty in evidence should however be no 
justification for disregarding a substantial element of a 
crime. 102 
238. 
Should fundamental principles of justice to the 
individual, which include proof of the causal 
element i£.' consequence er imes, be made to bend to 
accommodate evidential difficulties?103 
99 17D. 
100 See also De Wet and Swanepoel op cit 193. 
101 See Joubert (ed) op cit 125 par 128; Rabie op cit 
102 Strauss op cit 109; Rabie "The doctrine of common 
purpose" (1971) SALJ 238- 239; Joubert Ced) loc cit. 








SECTION III: THE BASIS OF COMMON PURPOSE LIABILITY 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
Although it now seems to be established that a causal link 
need not be proved when common purpose is alleged, the 
judgment in Safatsa un~ortunately did not solve all the 
problems relating to common purpose liability. As Matzukis 
points out, it is unfortunate that the case did not occasion 
an enquiry into the nature of common purpose and the manner 
in which it is constituted.104 
In a number of earlier decisions, the concept of mandate 
has featured as a possible basis of common purpose 
liability-105 In most cases, an actual mandate could not be 
proved,106 and accordingly the mandate was deemed to be an 
"implied" one (that is, a mandate which is derived from the 
circumstances)107_ The liability of participants who did not 
inflict the fat~l blow would then depend on the question 0£ 
whether the unlawful criminal result fell within the 
mandate.108 This concept has been criticized most 
vehemently, in particular by De Wet and Swanepoel: 
Ons howe het egter met hulle doctrine of common 
purpose die aanspreeklikheid van iemand wat 'n 
party is tot 'n afspraak om 'n wandaad te verrig 
as 'n soort kontraktuele aanspreeklikheid gaan 
beskou waardeur die een persoon dan belas word met 
kriminele aanspreeklikheid vir die dade van 'n 
ander.109 
The learned writers point out (correctly, it is submitted) 
that the reason why such a mandate would be unacceptable, 
apart from being ·i principle of the law of contract, is 
because it would be invalid - as being contra bonos 
104 Matzukis op cit 230. 
105 See Ry Duma 1945 AD 410 416-417; R v Mkize 1946 
AD 197 205-206; R v Mtembu 1950 1 SA 670 (A) 684; R v 
Mgxwiti 1954 1 SA 370 (A) 382; R v Motaung 1961 2 SA 209 
(A); Sy Nhiri 1976 2 SA 789 (RA) 791. 
106_ Joubert op cit 124 par 127. 
-~0!_. __ ~~bie OJ;> _cit 2_~Q_. 
108 Snyman op cit 281-282. 









mores. 110 Another objection to the "mandate" basis is that 
the mandate is virtually always construed fictitiously.111 
Burchell and Miltonl12 submit that there are two possible 
criteria on which common purpose could be based: agreement 
whether express or implied - or active association.113 The 
important observation ls made that active association is a 
far wider concept than agreement and may cover many 
situations other than agreement.114 
Express agreement would involve "the articulated achievement 
of consensus ad idem between the parties that one or more of 
them should bring about the death of the deceased" .115 There 
are however, some cases of common purpose which cannot be 
explained in terms of agreement or consensus between the 
parties to it; such instances of common purpose without 
consensus typically involve murderous attacks by a crowd of 
people.116 This would constitute cases of active · 
association. t' 
Matzukis concedes that active association is less easily 
defined than agreement.117 It would entail three 
requirements, (as formulated by Whiting)118, viz that the 
party to whom the act is to be attributed must firstly be 
present on the scene at the time of its commission. 
Secondly, he must intend to associate himself with the 
commission of the act by the other party or to make common 
cause with the other party in its commission. Thirdly, he 
must give expression to this intention by some overt conduct 
(such as joining a crowd obviously intent on the commission 
110. De Wet and Swanepoel op cit 193; see also Visser 
and Vorster op cit 698; Snyman loc cit; Matzukis op cit 232. 
111. De Wet and Swanepoel op cit 197; Rabie op cit 
237; Strauss op cit 100. 
112 Burchell and Milton op cit 345. 
113 See also Matzukis op cit 231; Joubert Ced) op cit 
114 par 118-119. 
114 Matzukis op cit 231-232. See also Snyman op cit 
283. 
115 Matzukis op cit 231. 
-•···-----·---------- _____ 116 __ Whiting_op_cit_38'.':'..3_9_. ___________ -------------------
117 Matzukis loc cit. 









of ~he act in question and showing solidarity with whomever 
it is who actually commits it).119 
It would appear that the conGept of active association as a 
possible basis of common purpose liability is rather vague: 
-.,_ 
it seems clear that some kind of overt conduct 
(objectively ascertainable active association) on 
the part of the accused is necessary, indicating a 
common cause with the other party,- who commits the 
murder.120 · 
In this section an attempt will be made to ascertain on 
which basis common purpose liability has been placed in 
Safatsa and subsequent decisions, and in cases where active 
association has been relied on, to determine how the term 
"some kind of overt conduct" has been interpreted. This will 
also entail an~examination of the way in which evidence is 
evaluated in drder to arrive at a finding of common purpose 
liability. 
2. S v SAFATSA 1988 1 868 CA): 
As far as the facts were concerned, Botha JA was satisfied 
that the trial Court had made the correct findings regarding 
intention and active association: 
In the case of each of these accused, the conduct 
described above plainly proclaimed an active 
association with the purpose which the mob sought 
to and did achieve, viz the killing of the 
deceased. And from the conduct of each of these 
accused, assessed in the light of the·· surrounding 
circumstances, the inference is inescapable that 
the mens rea requisite for murder was present. 121 
It is sufficient that the individual partici2ant actively associated himself with the common purpose . 1 2 There is no 
need for an antecedent agreement: a common purpose can arise 
on the spur of the moment,,and can be inferred from the 
facts surrounding the active association with the 
"furtherance of the common design" _123 
119 See also the five requirements set out in s__y_ 
Mgedezi 1989 1 SA 687 (A) infra. 
120 Matzukis op cit 232-233. Emphasis supplied . 









Botha JA makes the following statement concerning the 
question of "implied mandate": 
the much maligned notion of implied mandate 
seems to me not to be without merit now that it 
is well recognized that the liability of an 
individual accusJd rests on his own mens rea 
alone .124 
It is important to note here that although Botha JAprefers 
active association as a basis for common purpose liability, 
he does not actually reject the concept of implied mandate 
either. 
3. S v MGEDEZI 1989 1 SA 687 CA>: 
One of the concerns of the post-Safatsa furor, was whether 
the participation of each individual accused in the murder 
of the deputy-,rliayor constituted sufficient "active 
association" in the crime to satisfy the element of unlawful 
conduct .125 The fact that there s.e.ems-tG-.be no clear 
delineation of the term "acttre'associa~" appears to have 
complicated this problem. In ffged"Erz~--;-~he Appellate division 
"elucidated and expounded"126 the requirements for liability 
in terms of the doctrine of common purpose. 
Botha JA is of the opinion that the trial Court had erred in 
dealing with the evidence by not giving proper consideration 
to the evidence of each accused. It had erred in precluding 
itself from its duty to consider the evidence of each 
accused separately and individually, to weigh up that 
evidence against the particular evidence of the individual 
state witness(es) who implicated that accused, and upon that 
basis then to assess the question whether that accused'a 
evidence could reasonably possibly be true.127 
A view of the totality of the defence cases cannot 
legitimately be used as a brush with which to tar 
each accused individually, nor as a means of 
rejecting the defence versions en masse.128 
\ 
In evaluating the finding of the trial court, Botha JA 
explains that the trial court should have considered, in 
relation to each individual accused whose evidence could 
124 900H-J. 
125 Burchell and Milton op cit 347. 
126 
127 703E-F. 





properly be rejected as false, the facts found proved by the 
state evidence against that accused, in order to assess 
whether there was a sufficient basis for holding that 
accused liable on the ground of active participation in the 
achievement of a common purpose.129 
In the absence of proot" of a prior agreement, 130 an accused 
who was not shown to have contributed causally to the 
killing or wounding, can be held liable for those events, on 
the basis of the decision in Safatsa, only if certain 
prerequisites are satisfied~ 
In the first place he must have been present at 
the scene where the violence was being committed. 
Secondly, he must have been aware of the assault 
on the inmates of room 12. Thirdly, he must have 
intended to make common purpose with those who 
were actually perpetrating the assault. Fourthly, 
he must ha~e manifested his sharing of a common 
purpose with the perpetrators of the assault by 
himself performing some act of association with 
the conduct of the others. Fifthly, he roust have 
had the requisite mens rea; so, in respect of the 
killing of the deceased he must have intended them 
to be killed, or he must have foreseen the 
possibility of their being killed and performed 
his own act of association with re1klessness as to whether or not death was to ensue. 31 
Botha JA also elaborates on the concept of "common purpose" 
~
itself, by saying that the indispensable notion of an acting 
in concert is inherent in the concept of imputing to an 
accused the act of another on the basis of common purpose. 
From the point of view of the accused, the common purpose 
must be one which he shares consciously with the other 
person. A "common purpose" which is merely coincidentally 
and independently the same in the case of the perpetrator of 
the deed and the accused is not sufficient to render the 
latter liable for the act of the former.132 
\ 
Another important point that is raised is that a mere 
spectator amongst a crowd present at the scene of the 
violence cannot be held liable; something more than mere 








Above and beyond the fact that the Mgedezi judgment provides 
a measure of clarification of some of the aspects of common 
purpose that Safatsa did not elaborate on,134 the value of 
the judgment lies specifically in the fact that there is a 
clear distinction between situations where there is no proof 
of a prior agreement (in which case the five requirements 
would have to be met belore liability based on common 
purpose could follow) and situations where there is in fact 
a prior agreement.135 
4, THE DEYELOPMENT IN SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS: 
In the light of the debate between "agreement" and active 
association, the decision in S y Yelani136 is of some 
interest. Following close in the wake of Mgedezi, the Court 
held in casu that if a person, who is the chairman of a 
meeting, with the necessary intent to kill, passes or 
authorizes what amounts to a sentence of death on another, 
with the subjec~ive expectation that the sentence will be 
carried out, and the sentence is in fact carried out, he is 
liable for the death of the victim at the hands of those who 
perform the actual killing pursuant to a common intent, 
irrespective of whether or not he was present at the time of 
the actual killing.137 One notes with interest that the 
Court refers to Ry Nienje and Others138 as authority. 139 
Although the Court had been referred to Safatsa on the issue 
of common purpose by counsel for both the state and 
appellant,140 the Court did not comment on the issue of 
Safatsa and active association. (This would have been the 
ideal opportunity to comment on the relationship between 
active association and prior agreement.) Important to n,::ite: 
judgment was delivered by Smalberger JA; Botha JA and 
Nicholas AJ concurred. 
Sy Petersenl41 offers an example of a situation where the 
Appellate Division refused to acknowledge that there was an 
acting in concert ("gesamentlike optrede") and accordingly 
134 See Parmanand "S,y Mgedezi 1989 1 SA 687 (A)" 
1989 Obiter 229. 
135 See Burchell and Milton op cit 335. 
136 1989 2 SA 43 (A). 
137 46F-H. 
138 1966 1 SA 369 (SRA). 
------ ___ 1~~-. _ 46q ... 
140 See 44A- B. 
141 1989 3 SA 420 (A) . 
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the appellant could not be held liable for murder. While 
acknowledging that where two persons participate in a 
robbery, and the one fatally injures the victim in the 
course of the assault, and the other subsequently acts in a 
manner which indicates that he associates himself with what 
has taken place, this subsequent conduct can be used to base 
an inference that he fo}esaw the possibility that the victim 
could be killed, and was reckless in regard thereto. Whether 
such inference is justified, will depend on the 
circumstances of each case. In casu such an inference could 
not be drawn, since there was no acting in concert by the 
appellant and the person inflicting the fatal wound 
beforehand, and no co-operation afterwards.142 
I~ Sy Jamal43 the Appellate Division did in fact rely 
extensively on the principles set out in Safatsa and 
Mgedezi.144 Referring to the five requirements laid down in 
the latter case, Vivier JA remarks that all of these 
requirements hwve to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in 
the case of each accused.145 The third and fourth 
requirements, especially, could only be established by 
positive proof of the acts of each individual accused.146 It 
is therefore necessary to consider the reliability of the 
evidence against each individual appellant in order ti:, 
determine his liability.147 (To adopt a global view of the 
totality of the defence cases in order to reject the 
evidence of an individual accused is not permissible.) 148 
Botha JA and Refer JA concurred. 
A further illustration of the approach of the Appellate 
Division can be found in Sy Nomokhlala1 49 . The Court came 
to the conclusion that there was a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the second appellant had in fact, by taking the 
deceased by the hand, actively associated himself with the 
aggressors who had formed the common intention to kill the 
deceased. 
142 425E-G. 
143 1989 3 SA 427 (A). 
144 See 436D. 
145 436G. 
146 4361. 
147 _ '1_36J -·---
148 439D. 






In my judgment it cannot be held, without pushing 
the bounds of common purpose too far, that the 
State has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the 
second appellant became a party to the common 
purpose to kill the deceased.loo 
In the judgment in Sy ~emani151, the Transkei Appellate 
Division (per Goldin JA) referred to Safatsa with approval: 
I respectfully agree with the conclusion by Botha 
JA that under our common law it is not required 
to establish causation as a 'fundamental element 
in the definition of the crime of murder· . Active 
association with the acts of the person or persons 
which caused the death of the deceased can also 
justiff a finding of his own mens rea and his 
guilt· 52 
The meaning of ihe emphasized passage supra is, with 
respect, not entirely clear. Does this imply that active 
association in itself is sufficient to base an inference of 
mens rea? (If so, this would run counter to the established 
position that mens rea has to be determined 
independently.)153 
The Bophuhatswana General Division (per Friedman J) has also 
confirmed in Sy Banda154 that it deems the position as 
formulated in Safatsa and qualified by Mgedezi, to be.the 
correct one . 
. This setting out of .the legal position is not only 
correct in principle, but is pragmatic, and 
establishes the proper nexus in imputing the act 
of one accused to that of another in cases of 
murder on the basis of common purpose .. . 155 
Friedman J warns however, that in the absence of prior 
agreement or conspiracy, the doctrine of common purpose may 
not be used as a method to subsume the guilt of all the 
accused with nothing more. It cannot function as a "dragnet 
operation" to draw in all the accused: association by way of 
participation, and the mens rea of all the accused involved, 
150 304H. 
151 1990 2 SACR 4 (TkA). 
152 7B-C. Emphasis supplied. 
J?~.- See Se.ct ion IV .. infra. 
154 1990 3 466 (BGD) . 
155 499J-500A. 
25 
are essential prerequisites.156 Even if the State does prove 
a common purpose between the accused, then nevertheless it 
is the Court's duty to evaluate the evidence against each 
accused separately and to ascertain whether the principle of 
common purpose can be applied to each and every accused157 -
the Court must perform -ihis duty as a matter of abundant 
caution to "ensure that.justice is done in the case of each 
accused." 158 
Sy Barnes 159 is another example of a situation· where the 
appellant in question had not committed any assault on the 
deceased himself. Although the trial Court had found him 
guilty of culpable homicide on the basis that he had 
associated himself with the fatal assault on the 
deceased,160 Booysen J held that there were certain 
difficulties in finding him guilty of having associated 
himself with the fatal assault; for instance, it was 
~ 
impossible to -find how this association had manifested 
'· itself . ( Mere pf°esence , even with unexpressed ap1rova l , could not constitute association in this sense). 61 
I lay stress upon the requirement that he must 
have manifested his sharing of a common purpose 
with the perpetrators of the assault by himself 
performing some act of association with the 
conduct of the othersh a requirement clearly not 
-~pre.ved in this case . 1°2 
.·· ) 
S y Nzo.J63 afforded the Appellate Division an opportunity to 
ullifiient on the situation where there was neither a prior 
agreement to commit murder, nor a common purpose relating 
specifically to the murder of the deceased. (It is 
undisputed that the appellants did share a broad common goal 
to commit certain acts of sabotage as members of the ANC.) 
The trial court held that there was no evidence of a common 
purpose to kill the deceased, but that there was a common 
purpose on the part of the "terrorists" to commit acts 0£ 
sabotage, in the execution of which design the possibility 
156 501E-F. 
157 5001; 502C-D. 
158 502D. 
159 1990 2 SACR 485 (N). 
160 489F . 
. --····.19L_A91A..,B;. 492H- I. 
162 492D-E. 






of certain "categories of fatality"164 must have been 
foreseen. Hefer JA accepts this premise, and proceeds to 
find that in the view of clear evidence that the appellants 
continued to participate in the execution of the common 
design [the acts of sabotage], despite their foresight of 
the possibility of the iurder, they fall squarely under 
paragraph (c) of the dictum in Sy Madlalal65 - to the 
effect that the parties to a common purpose are liable for 
every foreseen offence committed by any of them in the 
execution of the des i~n if they persist, reckless as to its 
possible occurrence .1 6 
Hefer JA rejects the argument that the appellants· 
participation in the common design is insufficient and that 
evidence of their association with the murder as such is 
required to render them liable: he.is of the opinion that 
this submission entails a disavowal of the principles stated 
in Madlala.167 ~~cording to him there is no logical· 
distinction between a common design relating to a particular 
offence and one relating to a series of offences, and 
therefore the argument that "some other crime" referred to 
in paragraph (c) of the Madlala dictum should only be taken 
to refer to a particular crime does not convince.168 
The startling effect of the majority decision in liz.o.. (per 
Hefer JA with which Nestadt JA concurred) is that in the 
absence of any prior agreement to commit a specific offence, 
and in the absence of a common purpose to commit a specific 
offence and with no evidence of active association with the 
commission of the act, an accused can be convicted of this 
specific offence merely on the basis that he shared a broad 
common goal with the perpetrator (which goal could possibly 
have been enhanced by the commission of this act) and under 
circumstances where the accused foresaw that the offence 
might possibly be committed.169 
It is possibly significant that the majority judgment does 
not refer to Safatsa or subsequent authority, but relies -
164 4G-H. 
165 1969 2 SA 637 (A) . 
166 7B-D. 
167 8E. 
-- -·· ---- - . -- . 
168 8F-H. 





as far as this section of the judgment is concerned -
squarely on Madlala.170 
In a "strong and compelling dissenting judgment" ,171 Steyn 
JA however held that neither of the appellants were guilty 
of murder since a broad~. overarching common purpose to 
commit sabotage in the Port Elizabeth area is not sufficient 
to lead to conviction of the appellants for the murder of 
the deceased. He refers to the decision in McKenzie v Van 
der Merwel72 and explains (correctly, it is submitted) that 
although this was a civil matter, the princi~les enunciated 
therein are also applicable in criminal lawl 3 - especially 
in this matter where the facts are analogous to such a large 
degree 174. 
According to him, the salient feature of the McKenzie case 
and subsequent decisions is that common purpose liability 
should be limite.p. to the commission of a specific offence, 
or to the case ~here another unplanned but foreseeable crime 
was committed in the course of the commission of the 
particular planned offence.175 The dicta of the Appellate 
Division in Madlala, Safatsa and Mgedezi dealt with specific 
offences committed by numerous persons, and the exposition 
of the doctrine of common 76urpose in these cases applied only to such situations.l The extensi~~ of the doctrine to 
a more general basis was not intended.l 
He is of the opinion that the doctrine of common purpose is 
founded (in the case of a non-perpetrator) on the principle 
of proximity (factual and in law) of the non-perpetrator to 
the commission of the offence in question.178 In the light 
of this conclusion he cannot reconcile himself with the 
majority view: 
170 See specifically 7C-8H. 
171 Burchell and Milton op cit 337. 
172 1917 AD 41. 
173 14A. 
174 16E. 
175 15F-G . 







Die leerstuk van gemeenskaplike doel is volgens my 
oordeel nie reeds deur ons regspraak verbreed om 
·n geval soos die onderhawige te dek nie, en daar 
bestaan geen regverdiging om dit in hierdie geval 
te doen nie ... Daar was in die onderhawige geval 
verkeerdelik gepoo~ om daardie leerstuk toe te pas 
op ·n feite-kompleks waarop dit nie toe2asbaar is 
nie en waarvoor dit nie bedoel is nie.179 
Sy Van der Merwe 180 dealt with the liability of a policeman 
for culpable homicide committed by a fellow policeman. The 
Court distinguishes between the facts in casu and the other 
judgments where it had been held that the doctrine of commQn 
purpose can be applicable in cases of culpable homicide,ltll 
on the basis that in all the other cases the act with which 
the accused had associated himself was also the act leading 
to the death of the accused. They were cases of assault 
where the accused had been a perpetrator, but his exact 
share and whether his act caused the death of the deceased, 
could not be ascertained. In this case however, the 
appellant was no party to the act leading to the death - he 
was in fact unaware of this - and could not be held 
liable .1 82 
Die kousale verband, selfs in die oordraagtelike 
sin waarin dit toegepas word, ontbreek dus hier 
geheel en al ... Met die handeling wat die dood 
veroorsaak het, het die appellant niks te doen 
gehad nie. 183 
To hold the second appellant liable in this case would 
amount to an application of the much maligned versari in re 
illicita doctrine, which must be avoided at all costs.184 
Sy Khumalo185 provided another example of a group killing 
situation. The Court refers to the judgments in Safatsa and 
Mgedezi with approval, and stresses the importance of the 
179 17B-E. ' 
180 1991 SACR 150 (T) . 
181 See Section V infra. 
182 156J-157 A. 
183 157 A-C. 
184 158B. It is interesting to note the difference in 
29 
--------- - - approach between- Yan der Merwe and--1::Iz.Q., - especially __ when ... -- ----- -- - ---
bearing in mind that according to precedent tl.z.Q. would be 
binding on Yan der Merwe. 




' I •• ' 
concept of active association with the act of the person(s) 
causing the death of the deceased.186 
It is quite interesting to note exactly what the Court deems 
to be "sufficient" active association. The participation of 
Accused number twenty i~ the events had consisted of his 
throwing stones at the house of the deceased and after the 
murder of the deceased, singing "Hey hey die hond is 
dood." 187 In addition to this he also mentioned to someone 
afterwards that they killed a policeman by stoning him, 
hitting him and then burning him. In reply to the argument 
that Accused number twenty's association with the attack on 
the deceased possibly did not include active participation 
in the murder, the Court replied as follows: 
Wat hy self presies gedoen het, is nie bewys nie, 
maar sodanige bewys is nie nodig vir 
skuldigbevinding nie.188 
/ ... 
The only evidence of his participation in the actual killing 
itself, is his own report to the witness; this constitutes 
an unprecedented elaboration of the existing dicta that the 
State has to prove at least active association in the form 
of a positive act.189 (There is direct evidence that he 
participated in the stoning of the house and the singing 
afterwards, but as the Court concedes,190 this in itself 
would be insufficient to justify a conviction of murder.) 
In Sy Mitche11191 the question arose whether the second 
appellant could be held liable for the act of the first 
appellant on the basis of the common purpose that the group 
had formed. It was held that the mere presence of the second 
appellant at the scene of the crime ·was insufficient tc, 
establish association by him with first appellant's 
actions.192 Therefore he could not be held liable for 
murder. 
The Court also held that the throwing of a brick (which was 
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group had picked up) involved means and consequences 
different from those contem2lated by the parties to the 
agreement to throw stones193_ Because of the different means 
employed by the first appellant, his actions "fe 11 outside 
the scope of the common purpose",194 and the second 
appellant could therefore not be held liable for assault 
either, since the throwing of a brick at the deceased can 
not be imputed to second appellant. 
In the recent case of S v Singo195~ a very clear line was 
drawn between prior agreement and active association: 
Our case is similar to those which have been 
considered in a number of recent decisions of this 
Court, where a common purpose arose otherwise than 
by prior agreement, and was manifested simply by 
conduct ... It is clear that in such cases 
liability r~quires, in essence, that the accused 
must have the intent, in common with the other 
participants, to commit the substantive crime 
charged (in this case, murder) and that there roust 
be an active association by him with the conduct 
of the others for the attainment of the common 
purpose.196 
(Unfortunately, the issues in dispute here did not warrant 
an extensive analysis of what active association would 
entail, since this matter actually dealt with dissociation 
from common purpose.197) 
5. CONCLUSION: 
Bearing in mind :t'he fact that one would expect the legal 
position regarding agreement and active association aa 
potential bases of common purpose liability to be quite 
clear after Safatsa and Mgedezi, the practical application 
of these concepts reflect a different situation. 
When regard is had, for instance, to the applicttion of the 
doctrine of common purpose in t:lzQ. and Khumalo 19 and the 
content that was given in these cases to the concept "some 
193 22B. 
194 23E-F. 
195 1993 1 SACR 226 (A). 
196 233A-B. 
197 See also Section VI infra. 
198 See specifically the position of Accused number 











kind of overt act", the conclusion seems inescapable that 
the Courts have not found a uniform approach to the basis of 
common purpose liability. 
Although the distinction between common purpose arising from 
a prior agreement and _common purpose based on active 
association is recogni~ed in principle in most cases,199 it 
is important to note that the vast majority of cases decided 
after Safatsa dealt with factual situations where active 
association, and not a prior agreement, was relevant.200 
Therefore it has not really been necessary for the Courts to 
demonstrate the effect of this distinction in practice. (S v 
Yelani201 would constitute one exception.) 
The effect of the decision in Mitchell is as yet unclear, 
but the reference to the actions of second appellant as 
"falling outside the scope of the common purpose" is 
strongly reminiscent of the mandate concept, and in the 
light of Botha.i"JA 's statement in Safatsa that this concept 
is not without merit, it would seem that the idea of mandate 
as a basis for common purpose liability still has to be 
reckoned with. · 
In conclusion it can be. said that although active 
association (in situations where there is no prior 
agreement) is recognized by the Courts in principle, every 
case is decided on its own merits and in each instance, a 
potentially different interpretation of what would 
constitute active association is possible. As Parmanand 
remarks: 
on the thorny issue of common purpose and 
allied perfidious concepts such as inter alia 
active association, the last word has yet to be 
spoken. 202 
199 Cf eg Singo supra. 
200_ See eg Petersen, J..ama, Memani, Banda, Barnes, 
_ Motaung and Khumalo _ su.prii . _____ _ 
201- Supra. 








SECTION IV: COMMON PURPOSE AND MENS REA 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
Even before the Safatsa judgment, it was trite law that the 
liability of an particjpant in a common purpose to commit an 
unlawful act depends ori his own mens rea. This was stated 
expressly by the Appellate Division in Sy Malinga203_ The 
mens rea of one participant is never imputed to another.204 
It is not necessary that intention in the form of dolus 
directus be present; dolus eventualis is sufficient (i.e. if 
the accused foresees the possibility that the acts of the 
participants with whom he associates himself may result in 
the death of the deceased and he reconciles himself to this 
possibility). 205 
Burchell and Milton point out that as far as the element of 
mens rea is cohcerned, the liability of any individual 
participant in a common purpose is assessed in the sa~e wifi 
as an individual who is not a party to a common purpose. 2 
However, two concerns regarding mens rea have emerged since 
Safatsa: when is the correct moment for assessing the mens 
rea of a participant in a common purpose, and is it 
necessary for a participant in a common purpose to foresee 
the exact manner in which the prohibited result (death of 
the deceased) ensues207? The latter &ssue has increasingly 
become contentious since Sy Goosen 2 8 , where it was held 
that a mistake as to the causal chain - i.e. the manner in 
which death is caused - can now under certain circumstances 
be material. 209 
The judgment in Safatsa and subsequent decisions will be 
examined, in the first place to ascertain what the general 
approach to the element of mens rea is. In the second place 
203 1963 1 SA 692 (A) 694F. 
204 Visser and Vorster op cit 691; Joubert (ed) op 
cit 119 par 124. 
205 Snyman op cit 284. 
206 Burchell and Milton op cit 341-342. 
207 Burchell and Milton op cit 342 list a further 
concern: whether a participant to a common purpose can be 
found guilty of culpable homicide. This is dealt with in:fra 
- see Section V. 
208 1989 4 SA 1013 (A). 
209_ This judgment is specifically relevant in cases 













the two issues set out supra will be addressed, the latter 
with specific reference to the judgment in Goosen. 
2. GENERAL ASPECTS: 
Botha JA makes it quity clear in Sy Safatsa210 that the act 
of one participant, in causing the death of the deceased, 
can only be imputed to the other participants if the 
necessary mens rea is present.211 He finds in casu that each 
of the accused had the requisite dolus in respect of the 
death of the deceased.212 - · 
In Sy Mgedezi 213, the presence of mens rea was reiterated 
as being one of the five requirements that have to be 
met:214 
... so, in respect of the killing of the deceased, 
he must have intended them to be killed, or he 
must have 1""foreseen the possibility of their being 
killed and performed his own act of association 
with recklessness as to whether or not death was 
to ensue.215 
In Sy Petersen216, Botha JA considered the most important 
question to be whether the State had proven beyond 
reasonable doubt that the appellant had the requisite mens 
rea in the form of dolus (albeit dolus eventualis).217 The 
Court eventually held that the conviction of murder could 
not in casu be sustained, in the light of its finding that 
the accused did not have the serious injury or death of the 
deceased in minct.218 
The two appellants in Sy Munonjo219 had been convicted by 
the court a quo on the basis that when they broke into the 
210 1988 1 SA 868 (A). 
211 896D-E; 900!. 
212 901H-J. 
213 1989 1 SA 687 (A). 
214 See Section III supra. 
215 706B-C. 
216 1989 3 420 (A). 
_ _g_17 ___ --423H'.'."L._____ _ _________ _ _____ _ 
218 424G-H. 





house, they already had a common purpose to commit murder 
(in the sense of paragraph (c) of Sy Madlala220, i.e. dolus 
eventualis). Nestadt JA disagreed, because he felt that 
although their common purpose included the possible assault 
of the occupants of the house, the decisive question was 
whether they had foreseen the possibility of the deaths. The 
answer to this, accord~ng to him, was in the negative: what 
actually happened was an extraordinary "twist of fate" which 
had not been foreseen by the appellants. Their purpose had 
only been theft and escape. 
In Sy Khumalo221 the principle that an accused must have 
the necessary mens rea, is emphasized once again: 
In gevalle van gesaroentlike optrede soos die 
onderhawige word daar onder bepaalde omstandighede 
afgesien van die vereiste dat die beskuldigde self 
die doodveroorsakende actus reus gepleeg het ... 
Die vere:i./Ste van mens rea is egter absoluut en nie 
onderhewig aan uitsonderings nie. Geen persoon kan 
aan moord skuldig bevind word ashy nie die opset 
(in een van sy verskynin~svorms) gehad het om die 
oorledene te dood nie.22 
The Court also explains that the intention of each· 
individual accused has to be proven. When an attempt is made 
to infer this intention from the mental state 
( "geestesgeste ldhe id" ) of a group of people, such an . 
inference is only justified where the court has no doubt 
that al the members of the group share this "eensgesinde 
opset", and that the accused was a member of the group in 
the sense that he shared this intention.223 
3. WHEN MUST MENS REA BE ASSESSED? 
In Sy Nkwenja224, the majority225 was of the opinion that 
the critical moment for assessing mens rea of a participant 
in a common purpose was when the common purpose was 
formulated. The minority226 held that the critical moment 
supra. 
220 1969 2 SA 637 (A) 640H. See also Section II 
221 1991 4 SA 310 (A). 
222 341G-H. 
223 343J-344A. 
224 1985_ 2 SA __ 560 (A)_ .. 
225 Per Jansen JA, Joubert JA and Grosskopf AJA. 
226 Per Rabie CJ and Miller JA. 
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for judging the mens rea of the participant in a common 
purpose was at the time when the unlawful conduct of the 
actual perpetrator was committed. 
Burchell an~ Milton prefer the latter view.227 They base 
this on the following argument: the intention of a 
participant in a commoh purpose to rob may initially not 
include the intention to kill or even the subjective 
foresight that death may result from the robbery. However, 
at some stage before the victim of the robbery is killed, 
the participant may in fact realize or foresee that one of 
the group may use violence which might result in the death 
if the deceased. If his intention is to be judged at the 
time the common purpose is entered into, he will lack the 
intention required for murder. If the intention is judged at 
some later stage before the victim of the robbery dies, then 
account can be taken of the change in the participant's 
mental state. 
The learned writers state (correctly, it is submitted)228 
that the majority judgment in Nkwenja, by not taking account 
of a subsequent change in the mental state of a participant 
in a common purpose before the completion of the crime, 
would involve a versari-type of liability. ( It would also 
not allow for the principle of dissociation from a common 
purpose, which has become firmly entrenched in subsequent 
dee is ions . ) 229 
In Sy Nzo, Refer JA states expressly that in a case where 
liability is sought to be imputed to the accused as an 
alleged party to a common purpose, it is necessary for the 
State to prove his association with the common purpose at 
the time of the offence. (Therefore he should be acquitted 
if it appears from the evidence that he dissociated himself 
before the commission of the offence. )230 It is submitted 
that this dictum is to be welcomed.231 
Burchell and Milton are of the opinion that the Appellate 
Division should, in Munonjo's case,232 rather have examined 
the mental state of the accused at the time when the 
\ 
227 Burchell and Milton op cit 342-343. 
228. See also De Wet and Swanepoel op cit 193-194; 
Bo ister "Common purpose: association and mandate" ( 1992 )' 
SACJ 169. 
229 See Section VI infra. 
230 llH-_I. 














deceased were shot instead of at the time the accused 
embarked on their housebreaking venture.233 (It is 
interesting to note that liw. is binding on Munon,fo in terms 
of the law of precedent.)23"4 
In Majos1235, the following interesting statement is made: .•. 
The enquiry is directed to the state of mind of 
appellant No 2 at the time he embarked on the 
venture .... although his act of association, for 
the purpose of his common purpose to rbb, must 
exist at the time of the offence .... _236 
Nienaber JA refers to NzQ. as authority for the latter part 
of the above statement. What is especially noteworthy, is 
that in evaluating the evidence, he comes to the conclusion 
that appellant No 2 must subjectively have foreseen, when he 
participated in the robbery, that someone may be killed in 
the course the½eof.237 It would therefore appear that the 
Court, in spite of the statement above, nevertheless 
evaluated the mens rea of the appellant at the time of the 
execution of the common purpose. 
Sy Mitchell provides another example of this approach: 
although not expressly, Nestadt JA assesses the presence of 
the requisite intention to kill at the time the appellant 
committed his unlawful act,238 
Boister suggests that the answer to the problem of how to 
prove that this intention exists at the moment the deed is 
committed (when there is only evidence of its presence at 
the time of the formation of the common purpose) is the 
following: if the accused does not withdraw, then in the 
absence of evidence proving the lack of dolus, the 
inescapable inference is that the accused remained conscious 
of the possibility of death at the time the perpetrator 
acted. 239 
233 343n68. \ 
234 See Annexure A. 
235 1991 2 SACR 532 (A). 
236 537D-E. 
237 538E. 
238 See Mitchell 1992 1 SACR 17 (A) 22D-I. See also 
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4 FORESEEABILITY OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE RESULT ENSUES 
Prior to Safatsa, the position, as set out in Ry Shezi240, 
was that the liability of participants in a common purpose 
depended on whether the result produced by the perpetrator 
of the act fell within the "mandate", and was not concerned 
with the means by whidh the result was produced.241 
This is also the view held by Botha JA in Safatsa: 
On the particular facts of this case the precise 
manner in which and the precise means by which the 
deceased was to be killed were irrelevant to the 
achievement of the common purpose.242 
In Sy Munonio 243 the Court also referred to the Shezi 
principle, but held that on the facts it was not 
applicable. 244 (The apparent approval which Shez i still 
enjoys here i&~actually surprising, since Sh~l~ can be 
deemed to have been overruled by Sy Goosen. ) 
The ratio in Goosen can be summarized as follows: 
My slotsom is dus dat opset ontbreek indien die 
dader se voorstelling van die kousale verloop 
wesenlik van die daadwerklike verloop afwyk. 
Anders gestel, moet opset by 'n gevolgsmisdaad 
daarop gerig wees om die gevolg teweeg te bring op 
wesenlik dieselfde wyse as waarop dit inderdaad 
veroorsaak is.246 
Steyn explains that the implication of this is that dolus 
eventualis should now be construed as the foresight of the 
possibility of a consequence occurring in substantially the 
same manner as that in which it actually occurred, together 
with a reconciliation with that consequence. 247 
240 1948 2 SA 119 (A) 128. 
\ 
30 See also Burchell and Hunt Criminal Law 435; 
Snyman op cit 281. 
242 902A. 
243 1990 1 SACR 369 CA). 
244 364B-C. 
245 1989 4 SA 1013 CA) . 
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The first judgment in which the effect of Goosen on common 
purpose liability was visibly demonstrated, was s__y_ 
Mitche112 48. Nestadt JA points out that the Goosen dictum 
constituted an exception to the Shezi principle, and that in 
casu the Shezi principle does not apply.249 Because of the 
different means employed by the first appellant, his actions 
fe 11 outside the scope·•-of the common purpose, and his 
throwing of a brick at the deceased cannot be imputed to 
second appellant.250 
Boister explains that prior to Goosen, the law would not 
have differentiated between assault with a brick and assault 
with a stone. The a·ssault that the second appellant was . 
potentially liable for was not the assault with the stones 
he had subscribed to, but the assault with the brick which 
he had not subscribed to. Therefore he could not be held 
liable. 251 
This is a clea~ demonstration of the view held by 
Burchell:252 he is of the opinion that the new approach 
initiated by Van Heerden JA in Goosen will prove most 
valuable as a way of limiting liability in common purpose 
cases.253 Where the State relies on common purpose to avoid 
the necessity of proving a causal link between the accused's 
actions and the death of the deceased, the absence of dolus 
will become an important defence for the accused. 254 
5. CONCLUSION: 
When looking at the joint effect of cases like Safatsa, 
Mgedezi, Petersen, Munonjo, and Khumalo, it is very clear 
that mens rea is an essential prerequisite for common 
purpose liability. It is also clear that the mens rea of 
each participant must be considered individually. 
In spite of the majority judgment in Nkwen5a, the position 
regarding the moment when common purpose is to be assessed, 
248 1992 1 SACR 17 (A). 
249 23E-F. 
250 23F. 
251 Boister op cit 171. 
252. Burche 11 "Mistake or ignorance as to the causa 1 
sequence" (1990) SALJ 173; "S v Nzo 1990 1 SA 1 (A)" (1990) 
SACJ 352. 
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seems to have changed, as illustrated by Nz.Q, Ma,iosi and 
Mitchell. It is submitted that this change was necessitated 
inter alia by the increasing emphasis on the possibility of 
dissociation from a common purpose: if it is accepted that 
common purpose has to be assessed at the moment of "the 
hatching of the plot" and that any subsequent change of 
heart is irrelevant, n~ room is left for a possible finding 
of dissociation. 
It is quite disconcerting to note that in spite of the fact 
that Goosen dates from 1989, its effect was only felf in 
Mitchell. (A stringent application of the Goosen rule in 
some of the later decisions, eg Nz.o., would in my opinion 
have brought about a markedly different result; it could 
hardly be said - on the basis of the evidence available -
that the accused in Nz.o. had foreseen the exact manner in 
which the deceased was eventually killed.) If, for the sake 
of argument, Goosen had preceded Safatsa, it is conceivable 
that the accus~d in Safatsa might have been acquitted on 
this ground. (It is interesting to note that it was actually 
argued on behalf of the appellants in Safatsa that the final 
act of setting the deceased alight fell outside the purview 
of any common purpose to which the appellants were parties 
and that they could therefore not be held responsible f,:,r 
the deceased's death. This argument was however 
rejected . ) 255 
Although the last word certainly has not been spoken about 
the Goosen principle itself, mainly because of the 1 
uncertainty of what would constitute a "wesenlike 
afwyking",256 it is submitted that its application in common 
purpose cases would indeed have the welcome effect 0£ 
limiting liability, as suggested by Burchell.257 
Whether a particular link in the causal chain is 
so "markedly different" that it produces an 
unforeseen result is a question of fact into which 
policy will inevitably intrude; but once it is 
established there can be no dolus in respect of 
the result.258 
255 90 lJ-902A. 
256 See Bo~st~r ___ loc 9_i~; ___ Ste)'Il op cit 107. 
257 Supra. 
258 Boister loc cit. 
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SECTION V: COMMON PURPOSE AND CULPA 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
One of the angels perching precariously on th~ academic 
pinhead of common pur2ose has been the vexed question 
~heth~r it is ~os~ibl/·to be ~onvicted of a so-call~d 
negligence crime on the basis of this doctrine,259 the 
problem being that it seems inconceivable to have a common 
purpose to be negligent260 or to "intend to be 
negligent"261. In 1971, Rabie voiced this concern as 
follows: 
Common purpose as regards the victim's death in 
cases of culpable homicide is conceptually 
excluded because the design of the participants 
cannot be aimed at the commission of a crime of 
negligence by them: design indicates intention and 
intention~and negligence are mutually exclusive 
concepts.262 
Although this issue was not addressed directly in Safatsa, 
it has cropped up in a number of subsequent decisions. An 
attempt will be made to ascertain if any development has 
taken place and to what extent this development might have 
been coloured by Safatsa. This will be done with reference 
to the relevant cases as well as the opinions of certain 
writers. 
2. S v SAFATSA 1988 1 SA 868 <A>: 
The most significant pre-Safatsa Appellate Divis ion judgment 
dealing with the relation between culpable homicide and 
common purpose was Sy NkwenJ.a.263, where Jansen JA makes the 
following remark: 
259 See eg Burchell and Milton op cit 344. 
260 Visser and Vorster op cit 714. 
261 Snyman op cit 285. 
___________________________ 2~~ . ___ .Rab ie _op_ cit 2 4..4-:::2 4 5 .. __ 
263. 1985 2 SA 560 (A). See also Sy Coetzee 1974 3 SA 
571 (T); s v Penton 1979 2 PHH 157 (A); S v Andrews JJ 1980 





Die appellant het saamgewerk met die 
verwesenliking van die gesamentlike oogmerk. Op 
grond van die voorgaande blyk dit dat beide 
gehandel het met culpa ten opsigte van die dood 
wat ingetree het ... In die onderhawige geval is 
dit onseker watter appellant die dodelike geweld 
toegepas het en s~u dit moeilik wees om aan die 
een of die ander van die appellante 'n handeling 
toe te skryf wat conditio sine qua non van die 
dood was. Maar in ons praktyk word in gevalle soos 
die onderhawige, waar daar voorafbeplanning was en 
dan deelneming aan verwesenliking van die 
gesamentlike oogmerk, nie altyd streng aan die 
vereiste van kousaliteit (sine qua non) gekleef 
ten einde die een deelnemer strafregtelik 
aanspreeklik te stel vir 'n gevolg van die 
handeling van ·n ander deelnemer nie. Sonder om 
die juiste grondslag van hierdie aanspreeklikheid 
uit te.sVfp wil dit my voorkom dat albei 
appellante wel aan strafbare manslag skuldig 
is ... 264 
It must be pointed out ab initio that this dictum does not 
specifically deal with the issue in question. It is however, 
relevant because it is quoted in full in the Safatsa 
judgment,265 with apparent approva1.266 Botha JA uses this 
dictum to strengthen his own argument relating to the 
requirement of causation as far as common purpose liability 
in general is concerned.267 
3 . DEVELOPMENT IN SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS : 
Sy Kwadi268 was the first post-Safatsa instance where this 
question was squarely addressed. Steenkamp R refers to the 
earlier cases of Ry Tsosane269 and Sy Coetzee 270, (where 
doubt was expressed whether the doctrine could be used to 




267 See Section II supra. 
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as the cases of SY Thenkwa271 and Sy Nkwenia (supra) and 
of course Safatsa. He comes to the following conclusion: 
Dit blyk derhalwe uit bogemelde gesag dat die 
leerstuk van gemeenskaplike oogmerk slegs 
aangewend kan wor.d wat die kousaliteitselement 
betref, maar wat ~ie skuldelement betref, moet 
daar steeds gekyk word na die optrede en kennis 
van elke individuele beskuldigde om vas te stel of 
hy in die spesifieke omstandighede behoort te 
besef het dat die oorledene as gevolg van die 
gesamentlike optrede kan sterf.272 
He explains the effect of this proposition by saying that if 
a person participates in an unlawful assault, where he 
should have foreseen that the deceased could die as a result 
of the combined assault, he would be guilty of culpable 
homicide even if he did not specifically cause the death of 
the deceased add even if it is not possible to ascertain 
beyond reasonable doubt which of the participants had 
inflicted the fatal injury.273 
Du Plessis274 is of the opinion that the "extension" of the 
common purpose doctrine to culpable homicide as seen in 
Kwadi is justifiable; it is clear that there can in 
principle be no objection to this extension.275 She argues 
that the common purpose relevant here is the purpose of the 
three accused to assault the deceased: 
Alhoewel dit nie uitdruklik so gestel word nie, 
word aanranding met die opset om renting te beseer 
('n opsetsmisdaad) se skuldvereiste gebruik as die 
grondslag om strafbare manslag ('n nalatigheids-
misdaad) te bewys. Dit is miskien hierdie aspek 
wat verwarring kan skep.276 . 
She then explains that the common purpose regarding the 
"other offence" is not being used to prove the element of 
mens rea, but merely to eliminate the necessity to prove a 
causal connection between ~he act of a specific participant 
and the prohibited result. The element of mens rea still has 
to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore this dictum 
271 1970 3 SA 529 (A). 
272 527E-F. 
273 527F-G. 




should allay any fears that the application of the doctrine 
in cases of culpable homicide would amount to a "gemeenskap-
like be doe ling om na la tig te wees" . 277 
In Sy Barnes278 the accused was also charged with culpable 
homicide. The issue here was whether the accused had 
associated himself wit~ the fatal assault, and where the 
Court does refer to the authorities quoted above,279 it is 
merely to confirm that the presence of the appellant on the 
scene of the assault is insufficient to constitute active 
association in the sense required in Safatsa.280 It does not 
take the present enquiry any further. 
SY Yan der Merwe 281 presented another opportunity to 
consider the role of the doctrine of common purpose in cases 
of culpable homicide. The trial court had assumed that this 
doctrine is applicable in cases of culpable homicide.282 Van 
Dijkhorst R refers to Sy Coetzee283, where the contrary had 
been held, anci/''then expresses the opinion that reference by 
the trial court to Safatsa and Mgedezl is not conclusive, 
since these were instances where dolus was an element of the 
offence and intent was inferred from the "gemeenskaplike 
optrede" and from association with the intent of others. 
There was also partici:12ation in the fatal attack, although 
there was no causation.284 As far as causation is concerned, 
he refers to Safatsa once again, and argues that, as 
illustrated by Nkwenja, the approach of the Appellate 
Divis ion is not only limited to "opsetsm·isdade" . 285 
Although this approach would seem to be in conflict with the 
earlier Appellate Division dictum in Thenkwa, Van Dijkhorat 
J appears to accept it as the correct one. He then makes the 
following distinction between the cases referred to and the 
facts in casu: 
277 Ibid. 
\ 
278 1990 2 SACR 485 (N) • 
279 491B-G. 
280 See also Section III supra. 
281 1991 1 SACR 150 (T) . 
282 1551. 









Hoe dit ook al sy, in al die sake was die tipe 
handeling waarmee die beskuldigde horn vereenselwig 
het die handeling wat direk tot die dood gelei 
het. Dit was aanrandingsake waar die beskuldigde 
'n deelnemer was, waar sy presiese aandeel en of 
sy handeling die _dood veroorsaak het, nie 
vasgeste 1 kon wor'd nie. Die beskuldigde het egter 
in elke geval deelgeneem aan die lewensgevaarlike 
optrede wat tot die dood aanleiding gegee het. 
Juis hierin le die onderskeid met die onderhawige 
geval. 286 
He is of the opinion that in casu the appellant had nothing 
to do with the act which caused the death of the 
deceased.287 He also experiences difficulties in finding 
that the appellant had the necessary mens rea: he explains• 
that even if the reasonable man would foresee that a firearm 
would be used for this kind of extortion, he would not also 
foresee that i~ would be loaded and pointed at another 
person, and that the trigger would be pulled either 
intentionally or accidentally.288 The appellant was 
accordingly acquitted. 
De Vos er i tic izes the finding of V.an DUkhorst J. She is of 
the opinion that in the light of his finding that causati1:::ln 
was completely absent, he should have applied the doctrine 
of common purpose and convicted the appellant on this 
basis.289 (Our respectful submission is that a careful 
reading of the judgment reveals that this is in fact the 
approach that had been followed, but the fact that the 
conduct of the appellant did not constitute "active 
association" led to his subsequent acquittal.) 
De Vos argues that in the first place the appellant waa 
present on the scene; according to her the fact that he 
happened to be in another room, is of no importance. It is 
debatable whether under the circumstances this "presence" is 
sufficient to comply with the first requirement set out in 
Mgedezi,290 viz that the accused has to be present "at the 
scene where the violence was being committed". She also 
argues that the fact that appellant was involved in a "tsho-
162. 
286 156I-157A. Emphasis supplied. 
287 157C. 
288 157H. 
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tsho" action constitutes active association;291 however, as 
far as the appellant was concerned, the two activities (the 
act of extortion or "tsho-tsho" which he was committing and 
the conduct of his partner which led to the death of the 
deceased) were separate and distinct. Their initial 
intention was to comm\t "tsho-tsho", and any actions of the 
appellant were directed solely at this aim. It was not 
intended as active association with the (unintended) actions 
of his partner. 
She also makes the statement that Van Dijkhorst J differed 
from the trial court regarding the question whether the 
doctrine of common ~urpose is also .applicable in cases of 
culpable homicide.292 As pointed out supra, this is not 
entirely true. Van Dijkhorst J does refer to Coetzee in 
saying that in this case the doctrine of common purpose had 
been found not to be applicable;293 he however then 
distinguishes this case of "gesamentlike aanranding"294 from 
the present ong by saying that in casu the appellant had not 
participated in the actions which led to the death.295 His 
reference to Coetzee is therefore at best obiter. If the 
rest of his exposition of the potential liability of the 
appellant is examined carefully, it is clear that he is in 
fact applying the principles of common purpose liability, 
albeit not explicitly. 
Although delivered by the Bo~huthatswana General Division, 
the judgment in Sy Ramagaga 296 contains some remarks of 
potential interest for South African law. The salient 
feature of this judgment is that the applicability of common 
purpose in cases of culpable homicide was raised centrally 
as a point of law.297 
Friedman J lists a number of cases where the doctrine of 
common purpose was applied to cul2ab'ie homicide, 298 with 
specific reference to Ry Geere 299 . He then explains that 
291 De Vos op cit 162-163. 
\ 
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the judgments of boetzee and Penton created a certain degree 
of uncertainty,30 which was laid to rest in Nkwenia, where 
the Appellate Division "decisively and finally determined 
that the principles of common purpose could be applied in 
cases of culpable homicide"301_ 
He argues that the co~troversy concerning the true nature of 
dolus and culpa (which concerned itself with whether a 
conviction of culpable homicide can be entered where the 
evidence discloses that the accused killed intentionally) 
has been resolved by Sy Ngubane302_ This judgment was, 
incidentally, also delivered by Jansen JA (as was Nkwenja). 
It was held that proof of dolus does not necessarily exclude 
the existence of culpa. 303 This leads Friedman J to the 
following conclusion: 
This approach has been followed in subsequent 
cases and it can now be accepted as settled law in 
South Africa that common purpose can be applied in 
cases of culpable homicide.304 
The problem of culpa and dolus being mutually exclusive is 
solved in this way: 
4 
The apparent dichotomy is resolved by the 
postulate that a man may foresee the possibility 
of harm and yet be negligent in respect of that 
harm ensuing. This would involve unreasonably 
underestimating the degree of possibility or 
unreasonably failing to take steps to avoid the 
possibility of harm ensuing.305 
OPINIONS OF WRITERS: 
The writers appear to have widely diverging views on this 
matter. Snyman is still306 sceptical about this concept; he 
(reluctantly) concedes that in the light of Nkwenja (read 
300 464G. 
301 464H. 
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306 It is quite interesting to note that there is a 
marked difference between his two discussions of the subject 
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with Safatsa) the conclusion is unavoidable that South 
African law currently accepts that common purpose can be 
applied in culpable homicide cases. He explains that it 
appears from Safatsa that the fatal act of one person is 
imputed to other participants, not his intention. Every 
participant's intentiop must be determined individually. The 
same principle must apply to culpable homicide: if a number 
of people had a common purpose to commit a crime other than 
murder (eg assault), and the victim is killed in the 
execution of this purpose, the fatal act of one is imputed 
to the other. However, the culpa of every participant has to 
be determined individually.307 
Visser and Vorster remark that in so far as the earlier 
decisions of Thenkwa, Coetzee and Penton are in conflict 
with Nkwenja, they must be regarded as overruled.308 Kwadi 
is also referred to with approva1.309 They make the 
important observation that in the· Nkwenja case the doctrine 
of common purpose was applied on a different basis than in 
Coetzee and Penton: in Nkwenja the Court applied the 
doctrine on the basis of a common purpose to commit a crime 
requiring intention and negligence in respect of the 
death,310 whereas in the earlier two cases it was held that 
this doctrine could only be relevant to crimes of intention, 
because it is impossible to have a common purpose to be 
negligent. 311 
Burchell and Milton are similarly of the opinion that 
negligence can be sufficient to found the liability of a 
participant in a common purpose, and the following reason is 
advanced: by virtue of the doctrine of imputing the act of 
the perpetrator to the other participants in the common 
purpose, all of these participants become co-perpetrators 
and a co-perpetrator's liability can, in certain 
circumstances (notably cases of homicide) be based on 
negligence. 312 
This view echoes that of Burchell and Hunt313 : according to 
them, the state of mind of a participant in a common purpose 
307 Snyman op cit 285. 
308 Visser and Vorster op cit 715. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Visser and Vorster op cit 714-715. 
311. See also Mare "Gemeenskaplike oogmerk by 
st1"'..afbaremanslag" C1986LSACC.63. - -- --
312 Burchell and Milton op cit 344. 




may consist in intention or negligence in the ordinary 
connotation of these two concepts. Thus, if one-participant 
in a common purpose did not foresee the principal offender's 
killing as a possibility, but a reasonable man should have 
foreseen it, he may be liable for culpable homicide. 
5. CONCLUSION: 
It would appear that the basis on which the courts approach 
this question has undergone some change. In Coetzee and 
Penton the opinion was expressed that a conviction of 
culpable homicide could not be based on common purpose, due 
to the fact that it was regarded as anomalous to be 
"purposely negligent". A new trend was set in Nkwen fa and 
was subsequently followed (via Safatsa) in Kwadi and Van der 
Merwe, which entailed that the issue was viewed from an 
entirely different angle: once there was a common purpose to 
commit an offence and the accused failed to foresee the 
death of the deceased resulting from the execution of this 
common purpose (under circumstances where the reasonable man 
would have foreseen it), he can be held liable for culpable 
homicide if he actively associated himself with the common 
purpose. This new approach obviously benefited a great deal 
from the approval that Nkwenja received in Safatsa. 
It is submitted that the position as stated in Ramagaga can 
be accepted as the correct one. In principle there can be no 
objection to this application of the doctrine, bearing in 
mind the effect of Ngubane (as was done in Ramagaga) as well 
as subsequent developments concerning the doctrine of common 
purpose itself. If one accepts the basic premise that the 
doctrine of common purpose is viable in South African law, 
there can now be no doubt that an accused can also be 











SECTION YI: DISSOCIATION FROM COMMON PURPOSE 
1 , INTRODUCTION : 
The essence of common-purpose liability is based 
on association W\th the commission of the crime by 
the other participants. The converse of 
association is dissociation.314 
Dissociation is of course quite an important aspect of 
common purpose liability, since it is essential to alert a 
participant as to what is required of him in order to escape 
criminal liability, should he experience a change of 
heart.315 Khuluse explains that the issue of dissociation 
from a common purpose raises a number of questions: 316 Must 
the dissociation from the common purpose be express or may 
it be implied from conduct? Must the dissociation be 
communicated·to other participants in the common design? (If 
so, how?) At wflat stage can a person dissociate from the 
common purpose?317 Another question which also arises is 
what would constitute an "act of dissociation". 
The question of dissociation has recently received quite a 
lot of attention.318 This was largely inspired by the clo~~O 
succession of the judgments in Sy Nomakhlala 319 , SY Nzo 
and Sy Beahan321 It is quite interesting to note that 
until recently, the Zimbabwean law relating to dissociation 
was set out rather more clearly than its South African 
314 Burchell and Milton op cit 346. 
315 See in this regard also Ry Chinyerere 1980 2 SA 
576 <RAD) . 
316 Khuluse "Dissociation from common purpose" (1992) 
SACJ 173. 
317. This question is quite similar to the issue of 
voluntary abandonment from attempt: is there any stage (eg 
after the fatal blow has been struck) when it becomes 
impossible for the accused to dissociate himself from the 
common purpose? 
318. See eg Khuluse op cit 173-179, Parmanand 
"Dissociation from common purpose: a view from Venda" (1992) 
SACJ 180-186; Hales "Effective dissociation from common 
purpose" ( 1992) SACJ 187-193. 
_________________________ 3_1~._19891 SACR __ 3_0_Q __ (A) .... _____________ _ 
320 1990 3 SA 1 (A). 
321 1992 1 SACR 307 (ZS). 
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counterpart. 322 However, the South African Appellate 
Division has recently re-examined the position in s__y 
Singo. 323 
In this section, the development of the "doctrine of 
dissociation" will be traced from the pre-Sa~agsa case of 
Ndebu 324 , up until the latest case of Singo. 2 An attempt 
will be made to answer' at least some of the questions set 
out above. 
2. DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE CASES: 
2 1 S v NDEBU 1986 2 SA 113 <ZSC): 
In Ndebu, McNally JA was of the opinion that mere physical 
withdrawal from the scene prior to the fatal act was 
insufficient to excuse the second appellant. His flight did 
not dissociate him from the danger he had helped to create: 
his last-minute withdrawal was not communicated to his armed 
companion (first appellant) and it is possible that first 
appellant was not even aware that the second appellant waa 
no longer in the house. In this case, "successful" 
dissociation would have included the co-perpetrator's 
dissuasion (or attempt thereto) of the perpetrator from his 
fatal intention, or some form of protection (or attempt 
thereto) of the victim, coupled with his physical withdrawal 
from the scene prior to the fatal act. As Khuluse explaina! 
The mere change of the appellant's mind was not 
enough because the mind that needed to be changed 
was not his alone but also the mind of his armed 
companion.326 
The question whether an attempt to frustrate the criminal 
design is a prerequisite of effective dissociation, was left 
open Sy Ndebu. However, McNally JA points out it may be 
necessary, in the light of different sets of circumstances, 
to analyze more fully what is meant by the phrase 
"dissociate himself from", and to look at the reliability of 
the English requirements that in certain cases something 
more positive is required of the one seeking to dissociate 
himself than "merely to ru~ away". 
322 See also Hales op cit 188. 
323. The degree to which this judgment can be said to 
have settled the matter is discussed infra. 
324 1986 2 SA 113 (ZS). 





In his eventual finding, McNally JA does in fact require 
more of the second appellant than merely running away: as 
set out above, it was felt that he should rather have taken 
steps to disarm or dissuade his companions or to protect the 
victim.327 Although not stated unequivocally, it would 
appear that the approa~h of the Court is to require more of 
an accused under these'~ircumstances than merely absenting 
himself from the scene of the crime - at least some attempt 
to frustrate the plan is needed. 
2, 2 S v NOMAKHLALA 1989 1 SACR 300 CA> : 
In S Y Nomakhlala the first appellant's "dissociation" 
consisted of his refusal to comply with an instruction to 
stab the deceased and his subsequent withdrawal from the 
scene of the crime. Although it was submitted on behalf of 
the State that what the first appellant had done did not 
amount to a proper dissociation (it was suggested that he 
should at leas~ have tried to dissuade his alleged 
companions or to protect the deceased in some way),328 the 
Court held that under the specific circumstances it would 
not have been very prudent for the first appellant to have 
done this - he was not a ·comrade' like the rest of the 
group. 
The Court was also referred to Ndebu,329 but this case was 
distinguished on the basis that the "socius criminis in 
Ndebu's case initially participated in the commission of the 
crime with a full appreciation that death might ensue••33O_ 
In casu the first appellant did not do so. In any event the 
first appellant did not merely run away; he actually refused 
to comply with the instruction to stab the deceased when he 
realized what the assailants "had in mind for the 
deceased" _331 Thereafter he withdrew from the scene. 
It can therefore be said332 that Nomakhlala illustrates a 
willingness to accept dissociation as "the co-perpetrator·s 
positive indication of his unwillingness to participate in 
327 137E-F. 
328 30 3I-J. 
329 304B. 
___________________ -----~~-o._ 3(J.4B=G :_ 
331 304C. 




the fatal act, coupled with his physical withdrawal from the 
scene prior to the killing of the victim".333 
2.3 S v NZO 1990 3 SA 1 CA): 
The question of dissoc,iation featured again in the majority 
judgment in Nz&_.334 The Court held that the conduct of the 
first appellant after he had been detained was a "plain act 
of abjuration": why did he behave in this manner unless he 
wanted no further part in the mission?335 It was also 
stressed again that in a case where liability is sought to 
be imputed to the accused as an alleged party to a common 
pur~ose, it is necessary for the State td prove his 
association with the common purpose at the time of the 
commission of the offence. Therefore he should be acquitted 
if it appears from the evidence that he dissociated himself 
before its commission.336 
Parmanand summarizes the"~ interpretation" of 
dissociation as follows: 
... the co-perpetrator's dissociation from a common 
purpose by doing something positive, prior to the 
killing . 337 
It cannot be said that~ provides any hard and fast rule 
regarding dissociation. This is clear from Parmanand's 
summary: "doing something positive" is a very wide concept. 
Unfortunately no further guidelines are to be found in the 
judgment itself. 
2.4 S v BEAHAN 1992 1 SACR 307 CZS): 
At this stage of the enquiry it might be useful to have a 
brief look at the Zimbabwean position, and more specifically 
the decision in Sy Beahan. Gubbay CJ examines -both 
Zimbabwean and English law,338 and comes to the conclusion 
333 See however discussion of Singo (infra) for a 
different view of Nomakhlala. 
334_ Although Steyn JA agreed in principle that the 
first appellant had dissociated himself from the general 
common purpose, the question never featured in the minority 
judgment due to the different approach followed regarding 
the scope of common purpose - see Nz&. 1990 3 SA 1 (A) 17E. 
335. lOJ-llD. 
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that it is the actual role of the conspirator which should 
determine the kind of withdrawal necessary to effectively 
terminate his liability for the commission of the crime. He 
states the rule as follows: 
Where a person has merely conspired with others to 
commit a crime bJt has not commenced an overt act 
towards the successful completion of that crime, a 
withdrawal is effective upon timely and 
unequivocal notification to the co-conspirators of 
the decision to abandon the common unlawful 
purpose. Where, however, there has been 
participation in a more substantial manner 
something further than a communication to the co-
conspirators of the intention to dissociate is 
necessary. A reasonable effort to nullify or 
frustrate the effect of his contribution is 
required.339 
r 
In arriving at this conclusion, Gubbay CJ relies inte~ alia 
on the English decision Ex parte Becerra and Cooper3 4U as 
well as other several other decisions and the opinions of 
English and Zimbabwean authors. He also states that to the 
extent that the principle enunciated in Chinyerere 341 is at 
variance with his conclusion (viz that a reasonable effort 
to nullify or frustrate the effect of his contribution is 
required), he would depart from it. 
It is reiterated that mere absence of physical presence or a 
physical change of place or flight from the scene, even in 
consequence of voluntary action,342 may not (depending on 
the circumstances) serve to dissociate a co-conspirator.343 
Hales explains that although Beahan does not constitute a 
'turning-point' in the law relating to common purpose, its 
merit lies in the fact that it has provided some degree of 
clarity as to the principles applicable to this "complex 
doctrine" . 344 
339 324B-D. 
340 (1976) 62 Cr App R 212 (CA). (Quoted in Beahan 
1992 1 SACR 307 (ZS) 322I.) 
341_ Supra. 
342_ As opposed to involuntary absence due to arrest 
54 









2.5 S v SINGO 1993 l SACR 226 CA}: 
Until the recent decision in Sy Singo, the cases of 
Nomakhlala and NZQ. were the only definitive South African 
judgments on the issue of dissociation.345 Parmanand argues 
(correctly, it is submitted) that unfortunately none of 
these decisions provid~d an absolute formula to determine 
the exact circumstances in which one can be said to have 
dissociated oneself from a common purpose.346 
Undoubtedly, more amplification on thus aspect 
will be provided in some future judgment .. _347 
In Singo, Grosskopf JA does provide this amplification (to 
some extent). He states that there are several authorities 
on the topic of dissociation in our courts and those of 
Zimbabwe, but that most of them deal with common purpose 
arising from express agreement or conspiracy: R v 
Chinyerere, s Y Ndebu, s v Nzo, s Y Beahan. <SY Nomakhlala 
is distinguished - correctly, it is submitted - on the 
basis that this was not really a case of dissociation from 
common purpose, but that the first appellant had in £act 
never associated himself with a common purpose to kill the 
deceased.)348 · 
Grosskopf JA states that the approach followed in Beahan's 
case and earlier authorities, are not of real assistance for 
the present purposes, where we are not dealing with the 
position of co-conspirators or with a person who incited or 
instigated others to commit an offence. The current case is 
similar to those which have been considered in a number of 
recent decisions, where a common purpose arose otherwise 
than by prior agreement, and was manifested simply by 
conduct: SY Safatsa, S v Mgedezi, ~. SY Khumalo. 
In these cases, liability required that the accused must 
have the intent, in common with the other participants, to 
commit the substantive crime charged and that there must be 
an active association by him with the conduct of the others 
for the attainment of the common purpose.349 
\ 
If these two requirements are necessary for the creation of 
liability on the grounds of common purpose, it would follow, 
according to Grosskopf JA, that liability would only 
continue while both requirements remain satisfied (or: that 
345 Ndebu and Beahan being Zimbabwean deciiions. 
346 Parmanand op cit 180. See also Hales op cit 193. 
347 Parmanand __ loc_ci t. ______________________ .. _____ _ ___________ _ 
34B 232G. 






liability would cease when either requirement is no longer 
satisfied) . 
He does however explain that from a practical point of view 
it is difficult to imagine situations in which a participant 
would be able to escape liability on the grounds that his 
active association had~ceased while his intent to 
participate remained undiminished. One must postulate an 
initial active association to make him a participant in the 
common purpose in the first place. If he then desists 
actively participating whilst still retaining his intent to 
commit the offence in conjunction with the others, the 
result would normally be that his initial actions would 
constitute a sufficient active association with the 
attainment of the common purpose to render him liable for 
conduct of the others committed after he had desisted. This 
would cover he case of the person who, tiring of the 
assault, lags behind or stands aside and allows others to 
take over; he ~buld continue to be liable.350 
However, where the participant not only desists from 
participating, but also abandons his intention to commit the 
offence, he can in principle not be liable for any acts 
committed by others after his change of heart. He no longer 
satisfies the requirements for liability on the grounds of 
common purpose. 
Grosskopf JA's approach can be summarized as follows: 
although it can be said in principle that liability 
continues only while both requirements (intent and active 
association) remain satisfied - and therefore the cessation 
of either would also imply that the accused can no longer be 
held liable - it is difficult to imagine practical 
situations where a participant would be able to claim that 
his liability had ceased because he had ended his active 
association under circumstances where his intent still 
remained. 






The test for dissociation which I have stated 
above will often be difficult to apply, but 
ultimately it is a question of fact and evidence. 
The accused starts with the problem that, ex 
hypothesi, he was an active participant in the 
common purpose, a~d a court may well be sceptical 
of his avowal of abjuration. Nevertheless, here, 
as elsewhere, the onus is on the prosecution. If 
in a case of murder a court has a reasonable doubt 
whether at the critical stage when the deceased 
received his or her mortal wounds the accused was 
still a party to the common purpose of those 
assaulting the deceased, the accused is entitled 
to the benefit of the doubt.351 
It is submitted that this approach is the correct one. It 
recognizes that there are differences between situations 
where common purpose liability arises from agreement, and 
where it is baled on active association, and that these 
differences would require different approaches to 
dissociation. Unfortunately, it does not address the problem 
of what would constitute dissociation in cases where common 
purpose arose from a prior agreement; it is submitted that 
in these situations Beahan could provide. useful guidelines. 
3. CONCLUSION: 
It is doubtful whether it can be said that Singo has done 
for dissociation "what Mgedezi did for Safatsa in relation 
to the re3uirements for liability on the basis of common purpose", 52 but at the very least the important distinction 
between common purpose based on a prior agreement and common 
purpose based on active association is now being recognized 
as far as dissociation is concerned. 
With reference to the questions posed supra by Khuluse, it 
cannot be said that any of these concerns have been 
"settled" in a conclusive way. It is submitted that all 
these problems would have to be approached according to the 
distinction made in Singo; ,it is conceivable that the 
question of what would constitute an act of dissociation 
would differ according to whether the common purpose arose 
from a prior agreement or whether it is based on active 
association. Where common purpose is based on active 
association, an accused can be regarded to have dissociated 
himself if either his intention or his active association 
ceases. (It would appear that in practice both requirements 
would normally have to be absent.) 
351 233G-H. 
352 Parmanand loc cit. 
57 
58 
Where a prior agreement is alleged, the participant's degree 
of participation would, according to Beahan, determine what 
is required for effective dissociation. Beahan requires more 
than a mere physical withdrawal from the scene or 
unwillingness to participate (as found in Nomakhlala): 
depending on the degrey_ of participation, either a "timely 
and unequivocal notification to the co-conspirators of the 
decision to abandon the unlawful purpose" or "a reasonable 
effort to nullify or frustrate the effect of his 
contribution" is necessary. (This is more stringent than the 
approach followed in for instance Ndebu and liz.Q..) 
One question which unfortunately has not been addressed at 
all in the cases pertaining to dissociation, is the issue of 
when an accused can dissociate from a common purpose (or: 
whether there is any point beyond which dissociation is no 
longer possible).353 It should be interesting to note how 
this aspect will be handled in future. 
1"" 
As far as any specific requirements regarding dissociation 
are concerned, a casuistic approach would have to be 
followed: 
... it is with some difficulty that one may devise 
a fool-proof formula to determine when it is that 
an accused may juridically be regarded as having 
dissociated himself from a common purpose to kill.· 
In the end each case would have to be decided on 
its own merits.354 
Although this statement was made prior to the cases of 
Beahan and Singo, it is doubtful whether it is any less true 
today. 
__________ 353_ -It should--be- noted that- the---issues in--dispute-in-
these cases did not really call for any discussion on this 
point. 




SECTION VII: CONCLUSION 
"Common purpose" het n ingewikke lde leerstuk 
geword wat wemel van subtiele onderskeidings, 
kwalifikasies en voorbehoude. 355 ---
It is submitted that tfiis statement by Strauss, dating from 
1960, still holds true today. The doctrine of common purpose 
as a potential basis of criminal liability rests on a number 
of nebulous concepts, which have been applied in such 
divergent ways that it is difficult to condense a linear 
gradient of development.356 The following reasons are 
advanced why this doctrine is not acceptable: 
1. In S v Safatsa, the Appellate Division unequivocally 
recognized the principle that a participant in a common 
purpose can be convicted of murder in the absence of proof 
that his conduct individually caused or contributed causally 
to the death of the deceased. Because the act of one 
participant in causing the death of the deceased is imputed 
to the participants, it is not important to ascertain 
whether a causal nexus exists between the death of the 
deceased and the conduct of each and every participant. This 
approach has been followed with approval in virtually all 
subsequent decisions.357 
It has been submitted that the reason why the doctrine of 
common purpose is preferred by the courts, in spite of the 
disregard of the general principles of common purpose, is 
that it is pragmatic and satisfies certain demands of the 
administration of criminal justice, most notably the demand 
that participants in a common purpose should not be 
acquitted on a charge of murder merely because the State is 
unable to prove a causal link between their acts and the 
death of the deceased. This is demonstrated by the dicta in 
Safatsa, Petersen and Banda cited supra. 358 As indicated, 
this use of the doctrine of common purpose is unacceptable; 
evidentiary difficulties should not be allowed to impose on 
the sphere of the accepted principles of criminal liability. 
\ 
2. An attempt has been made to trace the approach of the 
courts regarding the basis of common purpose liability as 
found in the relevant cases.359 Although the majority of our 
355 Strauss op cit 108. 
356 See especially points (2) and (5) set out infra. 
357 In Sy Yelani ands v Nzo, Safatsa is not 
expressly referr.ed to. __ - see _Section III sµpra.____ __ _ _________ _ 
358 Section II. 






writers (correctly, it is submitted) disapprove ·of the 
no~ion of mandate as a basis for common purpose liability, 
this concept has not been rejected; in fact, Botha JA's 
remark in Safatsa that the notion of mandate "is not without 
merit", has given it a new lease of life, as demonstrated in 
Mitchell. ·, 
One aspect which has received recognition is the distinction 
between common purpose based on prior agreement and common 
purpose arising from active association. In this regard, the 
judgment in Mgedezi has been of significance, especially in 
setting out the five requirements which have to be met in 
the absence of a prior agreement. 
It is submitted that it would not be unfair to say that the 
treatment by the courts of what is considered to be 
"objectively ascertainable active association" does not 
demonstrate a l);Iliform approach. (The disparity becomea 
especially obvious when examining the conclusio_ns reached in 
tl.z.o. and Khumalo.) In spite of everything that has been said 
regarding active association in Safatsa and subsequent 
decisions, the conclusion is inescapable that a casuistic 
approach is currently being followed in order to determine 
whether the conduct of an accused in a given situation 
constitutes active association. 
3. As far as the requirement of mens rea is concerned, there 
can be no doubt that mens rea (to be considered individually 
in the case of each participant) is an essential 
prerequisite for common purpose liability. This is 
demonstrated by the cases referred to supra.360 There has 
been a significant change in the position regarding the 
moment when mens rea is to be assessed; this change has been 
brought about by the combined effect of tl.z.o., Ma,fosi and 
Mitchell. It now appears that common purpose is to be 
assessed at the time of the commission of the offence, and 
not at the time of the formation of the common purpose. 
The dictum in Goosen regarding the foreseeability of the 
manner in which death ensues, has had some effect on common 
purpose liability, as demonstrated in Mitchell. It is 
submitted that the Goosen rule should have been applied in 
earlier decisions as well (eg tl.z.o.) where it would have had 
the welcome effect of limiting liability. 
In spite of the initial uncertainty regarding the question 
whether common purpose is applicable in the case of 
neg 1 igence er imes, it can now be accepted - after the 
judgments in Nkwenja, Safatsa, Kwad i, Van der ·Merwe and 
Ramagaga - that an accused can be convicted of a crime 
requiring mens rea in the form of culpa __ o~ __ _1:,he_ bas t3_ of 
-----·-- ---· - ""comrriOri" -Pui=i>oSe ~--- "(T-h"is-··-aeve·to-pmen t is in accordance with 




recent developments regarding mens rea,361 and in principle, 
it cannot be faulted.) 
4. The application of the concept "dissociation from common 
purpose" has been tainted by the same lack of uniformity 
referred to in the discussion of "active association" 
supra. 362 The position' has to a certain extent been 
clarified by the judgment in Singo; however, this decision 
is only really of value where the common purpose arose from 
active association (and even then,· the rules set out therein 
would be rather difficult to apply in practice, as the Court 
itself concedes).363 In cases where a prior agreement is 
alleged, it is submitted that the Zimbabwean case of Beahan 
could provide useful guidelines. In the final analysis it 
could be said that no "fool-proof formula" to determine when 
it is that an accused may be regarded as having dissociated 
himself has been developed yet. This frustrates the very 
purpose of recognizing the idea of dissociation in the first 
place: 1 .. 
The dominant policy of the law in allowing such a 
defence is to encourage the conspirator to a·bandon 
the conspiracy prior to the attainment of its 
specific object and, by encouraging his 
withdrawal, to weaken the group which he has 
entered.364 
5. This emphasizes the problem that was also referred to 
earlier, when an attempt was made to define active 
association: due to the fact that there are no set rules 
governing the concepts constituting common purpose 
liability, virtually every case has to be dee ided "on its 
own merits" . Apart from the lack of certainty which resul ta 
from this, it is submitted that the "unstructured" nature of 
common purpose liability allows value judgments, based on 
policy considerations, to intrude when deciding what would 
constitute active association (or effective dissociation). 
Boister points out (with reference to Goosen) that w~ether a 
particular link in the causal chain is so 'markedly 
different' that it produces an unforeseen result, is "a 
question of fact into which policy will inevitably 
intrude" . 365 
361 Eg Sy Ngubane - see Section V supra. 
362 See Section VI supra. 
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363 See the d iscus_s ion _of Singo _in. S~ct_i_on VI. supr~ . ____ _ 
364 Beahan 1992 1 SACR 307 (ZS) 322B. 
365 Boister op cit 171. See also Section IV supra. 
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i. 
This statement, it is submitted, is equally applicable to 
the concepts relating to common purpose. As Burchell 
explains, the tendency since Safatsa has been to limit the 
scope of the common purpose principle rather than to widen 
it. 366 This was done inter alia by the limits imposed on 
"active association" ip t1gedezi. The judgment in Goosen has 
also been employed in Mitchell to limit common purpose 
liability, as predicted by Burchell.367 He points out that 
the application of the concept ·a marked correlation between 
the ·foreseen sequence of events and the actual sequence ,:,£ 
events· involves to some extent "judicial evaluation aimed 
at limiting the scope of common purpose liability". 368 
However, the converse of this is also possible: that the 
judicial evaluation of the concepts underlaying common 
purpose liability can result in an extension of the scope of 
liability. It is submitted with respect that this is 
reflected in the majority judgment in tlz..Q._369 
In the light of the considerations set out supra, it is 
submitted in conclusion that the following statement by 
Burchell has to be concurred with: 
From a legal and an historical perspective the 
common-purpose rule is an anachronism and a return 
to standards of individual liability is both 
consistent with principle and politic at this 
time.370 . 
However, for the moment common purpose liability is still a 
reality in South African law, and the principles which have 
evolved must be applied, "however painful" 371 . ( It is of 
course an open question to which extent this doctrine is 
applied in the everyday, "normal course of business" 
administration of criminal justice in the courts.372 > It 
366 Burchell "S y Nzo 1990 3 SA 1 (A)" (1990) SACJ 
351- 352. 
367 Burchell "Mistake or ignorance as to the causal 
sequence" (1990) SALJ 17 3. 
36B Ibid. 
369 See also Burchell " S y Nzo 1990 3 SA 1 (A)" 
0990) SACJ 352. 
370 Burchell op cit 354. 
371 See Du Plessis op cit 148. 
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for future investigation. It is submitted - with caution -
that the doctrine of common purpose does not feature too 




must also be noted that the initial dissatisfaction 
surrounding the application of the doctrine in Safatsa, 
would appear to have subsided considerably. (No opinion is 
ventured on the question whether this is possibly related to 
the changes experienced in the political sphere and a 
concomitant shift in erphasis regarding prosecution 
policies). .· 
The hope can only be expressed - however unrealistically -
that the Appellate Division will at some future stage see 
its way clear to recognize the need to do away with this 
doctrine and to "return to the standards of individual 
liability". 
63 
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